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The Class Differential in Privacy Law
Michele Estrin Gilman†
INTRODUCTION
Many Americans are willing to divulge personal
information and even sacrifice civil liberties for the benefits of a
wired world. They will turn over their spending habits for the
convenience of shopping on-line, submit to body scanners and
suitcase searches to travel by air, and tolerate Facebook selling
their personal information to third parties in order to network
with friends.1 These sorts of surveillance bargains are rarely
struck by the poor. Low-income Americans travel more often by
bus than plane, they lack money to shop at Amazon.com, and
they are less likely to have a computer that makes social
networking possible in the first place.2 This digital and economic
divide does not mean, however, that the poor are insulated from
privacy intrusions. On the contrary, they endure a barrage of
† Professor of Law and Director, Civil Advocacy Clinic, University of
Baltimore School of Law. B.A. 1990, Duke University; J.D. 1993, University of
Michigan Law School. For their feedback on this article, I would like to thank Matthew
Fraidin, Leigh Goodmark, Dan Hatcher, Rebecca Hulse, Margaret Johnson, Rob
Rubinson and the faculty participants at the AALS Women Rethinking Equality panel
on Gender and Economic Equality, and the Poverty and Economic Mobility symposium
at the Washington College of Law. The University of Baltimore School of Law provided
support for this article.
1 See Gary T. Marx, Soft Surveillance: The Growth of Mandatory Volunteerism
in Collecting Personal Information—“Hey Buddy Can You Spare a DNA,” 10 LEX
ELECTRONICA 2 (Winter 2006), http://www.lex-electronica.org/articles/v10-3/marx.pdf
(listing various bargains individuals strike between privacy and surveillance). “Although
people acknowledge the importance of privacy, most value other things even more.” Jeff
Sovern, Opting in, Opting out or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal
Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1058 (1999). For instance, while many people will
claim to oppose privacy intrusions, they will willingly turn over Social Security numbers
and other personal information to telemarketers. Andrew Askland, What, Me Worry? The
Multi-Front Assault on Privacy, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 33, 34 (2006); see also James
P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4
(2003) (people support information privacy, but “understand that [their] interests in
privacy must be balanced against other interests”).
2 See Lindsay Greer, Questioning Digital Citizenship: The Answer to Economic
and Political Inequity?, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 651, 655-57 (2008) (reviewing
KAREN MOSSBERGER ET AL., DIGITAL CITIZENSHIP: THE INTERNET, SOCIETY, AND
PARTICIPATION (2008)) (explaining that historically disadvantaged groups, including lowincome Americans, have less access to the Internet and lower rates of use).
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information-collection practices that are far more invasive and
degrading than those experienced by their wealthier neighbors.
The law reinforces this class differential in privacy.
Consider the case of Rocio Sanchez.3 In June 2000, Ms.
Sanchez, after separating from her husband, applied for welfare
benefits and food stamps at a San Diego County welfare office to
support her infant daughter.4 One month later, an investigator
from the Public Assistance Fraud Division of the San Diego
District Attorney’s Office made an unannounced visit to her
home pursuant to a county policy called Project 100%, which
required home visits of all welfare applicants who were not
suspected of fraud or ineligibility.5 The investigator asked Ms.
Sanchez a series of questions about her husband and his
whereabouts, when she had last talked with or seen him, and
the reasons for their separation.6 He then searched the home,
including her bedroom closet, and left to question her neighbors.7
Ms. Sanchez encountered the investigator a few days
later when he arrived at her former residence searching for her
husband.8 She was there alone, cleaning the residence so that
she could recover the rental security deposit.9 In her presence,
the investigator proceeded to search the bathroom cabinets, the
bedroom, and the dresser drawers⎯all of which were empty.10
Again, he questioned Ms. Sanchez about her husband,
including asking why she was still speaking to her sister-in-law
if she was in fact separated.11 He demanded that she pull out
papers from her husband’s trash can that might lend clues to
his location, remarking that it was “funny” that she had never
filed a domestic violence complaint.12 Two months later, the
county approved her application for benefits.13 Nevertheless,
Ms. Sanchez was upset by these interrogations, particularly
the accusatory tone taken by the investigator,14 and she became
3 These facts are taken from the First Amended Complaint in Sanchez v.
County of San Diego. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief,
Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 00-CV-1467JM(JFS), 2003 WL 25655642 (S.D. Cal.
Mar. 10, 2003), aff’d, 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006).
4 Id. ¶ 12.
5 Id. ¶¶ 12-13.
6 Id. ¶ 14.
7 Id.
8 Id. ¶ 15.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. ¶ 16.
12 Id.
13 Id. ¶ 17.
14 Id. ¶ 16.
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a plaintiff in a class action lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of Project 100%.
Ultimately, in Sanchez v. San Diego, the Ninth Circuit
relied on Wyman v. James, a Supreme Court opinion from
1973, and upheld the home visits against a Fourth Amendment
challenge, reasoning that “a person’s relationship with the
state can reduce that person’s expectation of privacy, even
within the sanctity of the home.”15 In a bitter dissent from a
denial of a petition for rehearing en banc, seven Ninth Circuit
judges called the case “nothing less than an attack on the
poor.”16 As the dissenters stated, most government benefits do
not flow to the poor, “yet this is the group we require to
sacrifice their dignity and their right to privacy.”17 By contrast,
“[t]he government does not search through the closets and
medicine cabinets of farmers receiving subsidies. They do not
dig through the laundry baskets and garbage pails of real
estate developers or radio broadcasters.”18 As the dissenters
concluded, “This situation is shameful.”19
Welfare administration is highly devolved in that states
and localities have great discretion in how they structure their
welfare programs.20 So in another jurisdiction, Ms. Sanchez
might have been subjected to drug tests or finger imaging or
unsolicited family-planning advice, such as pressure to implant
a Norplant birth control device.21 Throughout the country, poor
women such as Ms. Sanchez face constant surveillance as they
must comply with extreme verification requirements to
establish eligibility for welfare benefits, travel to scattered
offices to procure needed approvals, reappear in person at
welfare offices at regular intervals to prove their ongoing
eligibility and answer intrusive questions about their child

Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 927 (9th Cir. 2006).
Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Pregerson, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See Christine M. Cimini, Welfare Entitlements in the Era of Devolution, 9
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 89, 101-04 (2002).
21 See, e.g., Harry Murray, Deniable Degradation: The Finger-Imaging of
Welfare Recipients, 15 SOC. F. 39 (2000) (discussing finger imaging); see also Pamela D.
Bridgewater, Reproductive Freedom as Civil Freedom: The Thirteenth Amendment’s
Role in the Struggle for Reproductive Rights, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 401, 404-10
(2000) (discussing Norplant); Jordan C. Budd, Pledge Your Body for Your Bread:
Welfare, Drug Testing, and the Inferior Fourth Amendment, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 751 (2011) (discussing drug testing).
15
16
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rearing and intimate relationships.22 Further, under federal
law, all jurisdictions engage in extensive data sharing with
other government and private offices to ferret out fraudulent
public assistance applications.23
The poor are subjected to privacy intrusions not only by
governments but also by private parties, such as employers.
Although a stated goal of welfare is to move welfare recipients
into the workforce,24 even if Ms. Sanchez obtained a low-wage
job,25 surveillance of her life and personal choices would likely
continue. In the white collar workforce, employers regularly
monitor e-mail, Internet, and phone communications of their
employees, raising the specter that information could “fall[]
into the wrong hands or . . . [be] used for a purpose we did not
envision when we disclosed it.”26 Nevertheless, most white
collar workplace monitoring is invisible and easy to ignore,
which may in part explain the lack of public outrage or
legislative protections against workplace surveillance.27 By
contrast, low-wage workers are concentrated in service
industries.28 They are more subject to visible—sometimes
humiliating—surveillance tactics such as psychological testing,
regular drug screening, and overt videotape monitoring.29
Criminal justice scholars have described a class
differential in privacy under the Fourth Amendment,30 which
protects reasonable expectations of privacy from warrantless
government searches and seizures.31 People who live in
crowded, urban neighborhoods and who cannot afford “a
freestanding home, fences, [and] lawns,” have a lowered
expectation of privacy and are thus more likely to suffer
22 See Amy Mulzer, Note, The Doorkeeper and the Grand Inquisitor: The
Central Role of Verification Procedures in Means-Tested Welfare Programs, 36 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 663, 664-65 (2005).
23 Id. at 672-73.
24 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2006) (stating that a purpose of Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF) Act is to “end the dependence of needy parents on
government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage”).
25 JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 191-99 (2007) (describing how TANF welfare departments
have adapted to the work-first mandate).
26 See Nehf, supra note 1, at 27.
27 See Daniel O’Gorman, Looking Out for Your Employees: Employers’
Surreptitious Physical Surveillance of Employees and the Tort of Invasion of Privacy,
85 NEB. L. REV. 212, 273 (2006).
28 See Devah Pager et al., Employment Discrimination and the Changing
Landscape of Low-Wage Labor Markets, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 320.
29 See infra notes 219-24 and accompanying text.
30 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth
Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 401-05 (2003).
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warrantless searches by government agents.32 These realities of
geography also mean that poor families are far more likely to
become entangled in intrusive child welfare and domestic
violence investigations.33 In addition, the homeless have
virtually no privacy at all; courts have held that their meager
shelters are not entitled to protection from government
searches.34 At the same time, the federal government mandates
computerized tracking of the homeless, requiring them to
divulge personal data when they seek social services.35
Meanwhile, more Americans with financial means are moving
into gated and private communities, thus buying themselves
privacy.36 As the experience of Ms. Sanchez reveals, this class
differential extends beyond the criminal justice context into
every corner of daily life.
Low-income Americans are a diverse group living
individualized lives; they are “indescribably varied and
multifaceted.”37 Despite this diversity, they share the reality of
Id. at 401.
See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children:
The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 413, 433-41 (2005) (describing child welfare investigations); Jeannie Suk,
Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 59-60 (2006) (describing criminal justice
interventions in domestic violence cases that result in “poor man’s divorce”).
34 See, e.g., D’Aguanno v. Gallagher, 50 F.3d 877, 880 (11th Cir. 1995) (people
who lived in a homeless campsite on private property did not have a reasonable
interest in privacy); United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1473 (10th Cir. 1986)
(no reasonable expectation of privacy in a cave located on public lands); Amezquita v.
Colon, 518 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1975) (squatters on public land had no reasonable
expectation to privacy); People v. Thomas, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 610, 613 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in a cardboard box used as a residence);
Whiting v. State, 885 A.2d 785, 799-801 (Md. 2005) (squatter’s expectation of privacy
was not reasonable); Commonwealth v. Cameron, 561 A.2d 783, 786 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989) (squatter in abandoned rowhouse did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy). Homeless persons have had better success with Fourth Amendment
challenges to the searches of their personal property. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F.
Supp. 1551, 1570-71 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (homeless persons had reasonable expectation of
privacy in their personal belongings); State v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145 (Conn. 1991)
(defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a duffel bag and box located in
the area under a highway bridge where he was living; court did not rule on whether he
had a reasonable privacy interest in his “home” itself). The law is contradictory with
regard to homeless shelters. See Steven R. Morrison, The Fourth Amendment’s
Applicability to Homeless Shelters, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 319, 333 (2009).
35 See infra notes 52-63 and accompanying text.
36 See Georgette Chapman Phillips, Boundaries of Exclusion, 72 MO. L. REV.
1287, 1302-03 (2007) (“in 2001 there were 7,058,427 households living year-round in
gated communities in the United States” and the law upholds these residents’
expectations of privacy and rights to exclude others).
37 JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND
THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 20-21 (2001) (describing demographic, political, physical, and
regional variations among the poor). On the importance of seeing and understanding
the poor as individuals with their own narratives, see Frank Munger, Identity as a
Weapon in the Moral Politics of Work and Poverty, in LABORING BELOW THE LINE 1, 20
32
33
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experiencing privacy quite differently on a daily basis than do
middle and upper class Americans. Given that at least 15
percent of the population⎯or one out of seven Americans⎯
currently lives below the poverty line,38 this differential demands
attention and discussion. To be sure, sophisticated surveillance
technology combined with limited legal protections should be a
serious concern for all Americans. Still, for most Americans,
these privacy intrusions are felt as a vague sense of unease over
being watched along with concerns about identify theft (an oldfashioned crime with a new twist). By contrast, low-income
Americans suffer tangible harms from government and
corporate surveillance that go beyond discomfort. The privacy
intrusions they face are often overt, and the harms are concrete.
The American privacy law regime has developed to
reflect middle-class concerns, and as such is focused on
preventing the misuse of information after it is collected. By
contrast, low-income people tend to face stigmatization at the
time information is gathered. The poor interact with the
government and low-wage employers in ways that are ongoing
and interpersonal, and, as a result, a “right to be left alone”39
does not protect their interests in dignity and autonomy. This
article argues that poor Americans experience privacy
differently than those with economic resources and that the law
reinforces this differential. This differential has costs not only
for the poor, but for all citizens. Our privacy laws and policies
should reflect equality norms to ensure that poor Americans are
not unfairly subjected to humiliating surveillance tactics.
The class differential in privacy law results from
complex interactions between class, race, and gender. Because
poor Americans are disproportionately minority and female,40 it
is impossible to talk about class without taking into account
how subordination is linked to race and gender. Critical legal
theorists have shown that anti-poverty public policies are built
on racist, gendered notions about the people who need relief. In
(Frank Munger ed., 2002). Munger writes, “If we understand [poor persons] not as
sinners or saints but as constituents of the mainstream like ourselves, we will be
willing to allow them the same latitude to fail or succeed that we grant insiders within
our own communities.” Id. at 15.
38 See Sabrina Tavernise, Poverty Rate Soars to Highest Level Since 1993,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2011, at A1 (stating that the Census Bureau reported a 15.1
percent poverty rate for 2010).
39 This foundational concept of privacy was articulated by Samuel D. Warren
& Louis D. Brandeis in The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890); see also
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
40 See JOHN ICELAND, POVERTY IN AMERICA 81, 88 (2d ed. 2006).
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turn, these public policies impact all poor people⎯even those
who are not minorities or female.41 The result is that the poor
as a group suffer extreme privacy violations, which in turn pose
a barrier to self-sufficiency and democratic participation.
Part I of the article describes how low-income Americans
experience privacy in the welfare system and low-wage
workforce. Women moving along the welfare-to-work continuum
face a bevy of humiliating surveillance tactics, and, as Part I
explains, the physical and mental health consequences of unfair
surveillance undermine welfare’s statutory goal of selfsufficiency.42 Part II of the article analyzes how the law privileges
middle-class privacy interests but fails to protect the poor from
privacy intrusions. As a constitutional matter, courts often hold
that the poor do not have reasonable expectations of privacy
entitled to protection. As a statutory matter, laws primarily
protect against the misuse of data, rather than its collection, and
thus reflect middle-class privacy concerns. As a common law
matter, the law focuses on reputational injuries; it has not
expanded to prohibit demeaning surveillance practices that target
the poor. Accordingly, Part III explores robust conceptions of
privacy that focus on values safeguarded by privacy, such as
dignity, respect, and trust. This part views privacy as a means
rather than an end. It concludes that class equality needs to be a
central concern of privacy law and suggests this can be achieved,
in part, by ensuring that data collection practices are fair and
undertaken with respect for their subjects.
I.

SURVEILLANCE OF THE POOR

Privacy is an amorphous concept, despite the
considerable efforts of theorists to pin it down. Scholars have
variously described privacy as the right to be let alone;43 the
41 See infra text accompanying notes 300-03 (discussing Dorothy Brown’s
theory that racist ideas underpinning Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) enforcement
impact poor white Americans as well); see also ICELAND, supra note 40, at 38-39
(discussing research showing a misperception that that most poor people are black and
how that perception has political consequences); MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE
WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 3-4, 60-80, 154-73,
204-06 (1999) (explaining how negative media coverage of poor black Americans has
perpetuated stereotypes of the black poor as undeserving and generated public opposition
to welfare).
42 From the perspective of welfare recipients, economic self-sufficiency has
multiple dimensions, including “the exercise of personal power and freedom.” Elizabeth
A. Gowdy & Sue Pearlmutter, Economic Self-Sufficiency: It’s Not Just Money, 8 AFFILIA
368, 383 (Winter 1993). As discussed infra, surveillance undermines autonomy.
43 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 39, at 193.
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ability to control personal information44 and access to the self;45
a precondition to intimate relationships and the development of
community;46 and an essential component of human dignity,
autonomy, personhood, and self-determination.47 Clearly, privacy
is connected with multiple values, and thus a lack of privacy can
impact the self as well as interpersonal relationships. For the
poor, surveillance by the government and employers implicates
multiple values. Part A describes the nature of privacy invasions
suffered by the poor in the areas of welfare receipt and the lowwage workplace. These focus areas are not comprehensive, but
they illustrate how large societal institutions encroach upon the
lives, homes, and bodies of poor individuals. Part B then examines
emerging psychological research to assess the harms caused by
privacy invasions. These harms amount to far more than hurt
feelings; the poor suffer physical and mental health injuries
associated with extreme stress.
A.

Privacy in Welfare and Low-Wage Employment

Poor people regularly experience privacy deprivations
related to their personal information, bodies and homes, and
decision making.48 This surveillance serves to control and limit
the autonomy of poor people, and has strong historical roots.
“Politically, the purposes of surveying the poor have largely
stayed constant for three centuries: containment of alleged
social contagion, evaluation of moral suitability for inclusion in
public life and its benefits, and suppression of working people’s
resistance and collective power.”49 Technology has enhanced
the ability of the state and private corporations to achieve
these ends. Although participation in government entitlement
programs and particular employment is technically voluntarily,
the reality of life and the marketplace is such that the poor
ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 428 (1980).
46 See JULIE INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 56, 58 (1992).
47 See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 1609, 1655 (1999).
48 The three broad categories of privacy interests are information, spatial,
and decisional. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202-03 (1998).
49 Virginia Eubanks, Technologies of Citizenship: Surveillance and Political
Learning in the Welfare System, in SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY: TECHNOLOGICAL
POLITICS AND POWER IN EVERYDAY LIFE 89, 90 (T. Monahan ed., 2006) (emphasis
omitted); see also GILLIOM, supra note 37, at 19 (“From today’s computerized information
systems . . . and back to the surveying and badging of the poor in sixteenth-century
Europe, governments have closely examined those who seek assistance.”).
44
45
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have little choice but to subject themselves to these privacy
invasions. Notably, the surveillance imposed on the poor is
usually overt; indeed, part of the purpose is to create stigma.
By contrast, other Americans are increasingly subject to “soft”
surveillance, which involves less invasive techniques, hidden
technologies, and implied consent.50 These methods of soft
surveillance raise deep concerns about civil liberties and lack of
choice,51 but they are profoundly different in character and
effect than the unconcealed, coercive surveillance tactics used
with low-income populations.
1. Welfare
As discussed in the Introduction, Ms. Sanchez, a welfare
applicant, faced informational, spatial, and decisional privacy
intrusions by the state. She had to provide welfare officials
with detailed information about her family, submit to home
searches, and justify the state of her marriage. Her experience is
emblematic.52 A typical applicant for welfare, called Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), must undergo a
multistage, multiday application process consisting of screening
interviews, application interviews, group orientations, and
employability assessments.53 She must answer questions
50 See Marx, supra note 1, at 1-3. For instance, Marx describes police asking
community members to provide voluntary DNA samples by mouth swab. Id. at 1. Marx
also describes other “disingenuous communication that seeks to create the impression
that one is volunteering when that isn’t the case,” such as building signs stating that
one agrees to a search upon entering the premises and consumer reward programs that
rely on giving up personal information. Id. at 2.
51 Id. at 5-6. These new tactics are driven by “the mass media’s
encouragement of fear and perceptions of crises,” “the seductiveness of consumption,”
and “the development of inexpensive, less invasive broad searching tools.” Id. at 6
(footnote omitted).
52 For the similarly intrusive questioning poor pregnant women are subjected
to as a condition of receiving Medicaid benefits, see infra text accompanying notes 35861, discussing Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 113, 114-16 (2011).
53 See HEALTH SYS. RESEARCH, INC. ET AL., STUDY OF THE TANF APPLICATION
PROCESS 2-3, Exs. 2-1 & 3-3 (2003) [hereinafter STUDY OF THE TANF APPLICATION
PROCESS], available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/app-process03; PAMELA HOLCOMB ET AL.,
THE APPLICATION PROCESS FOR TANF, FOOD STAMPS, MEDICAID, AND SCHIP: ISSUES FOR
AGENCIES AND APPLICANTS, INCLUDING IMMIGRANTS AND LIMITED ENGLISH SPEAKERS 3-6
to 3-9 (2003), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410640.pdf; MARCIA K.
MEYERS & IRENE LURIE, THE DECLINE IN WELFARE CASELOADS: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 26 (2005) (conference draft), available at http://www.npc.umich.edu/news/
events/newdirections/Meyers1.pdf. In Los Angeles County, the criminalization of
welfare is seen in the application process:

Today, a person who wants to apply for public assistance in L.A. County must
visit an Eligibility Office. In these prisonlike structures, visitors pass through
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ranging from her resources and sustenance needs to her
psychological well-being.54 Her own word is not enough; she
must also provide independent verification of her answers to
many of these questions, either through her own documentation
or through information gathered from third parties,55 and in
some cases, caseworkers conduct investigations themselves.56 As
part of TANF, an applicant must also comply with child support
enforcement efforts by providing detailed paternity information
about her children.57
Once a welfare mother turns over personal data, this
information is electronically shared and compared with numerous
federal and state databases, as well as commercial databases, to
verify eligibility and to ferret out duplicate or otherwise
fraudulent applicants.58 At any time, law enforcement officials can
demand that welfare and housing officials turn over personal
information about benefits recipients, even when the recipient is
not herself suspected of any crime.59 By contrast, state officials
cannot conduct similar fishing expeditions into the bank accounts
of those individuals with the means to maintain savings.60
Many jurisdictions distribute benefits electronically,
which allows them to monitor when and how funds are spent.61
While affluent Americans submit to market-research
surveillance designed to cater to their purchasing preferences,
the electronic systems that monitor the poor “facilitate the
invasive scrutiny of their purchases and discipline of their

metal detectors and past armed security guards on their way to the clerk who
is cloistered behind a Plexiglas window. There they must wait for hours in a
crowded waiting room before being seen by an Eligibility Worker.
Alejandra Marchevsky & Jeanne Theoharis, Dropped from the Rolls: Mexican
Immigrants, Race, and Rights in the Era of Welfare Reform, 35 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE
71, 79 (2008).
54 See STUDY OF THE TANF APPLICATION PROCESS, supra note 53, at 3-7.
55 See MEYERS & LURIE, supra note 53, at 27; HOLCOMB ET AL., supra note 53,
at 3-16.
56 See Mulzer, supra note 22, at 676.
57 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2)-(3) (2000).
58 See Allison I. Brown, Privacy Issues Affecting Welfare Applicants, 35
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 421, 427 (2001); see also Samuel V. Schoonmaker IV,
Consequences and Validity of Family Law Provisions in the “Welfare Reform Act,” 14 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1, 10-21 (1997).
59 See Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 643, 668-69 (2009).
60 Id. at 669.
61 See Christopher D. Cook, To Combat Welfare Fraud, States Reach for Debit
Cards, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 25, 1999, at 5 (describing how states monitor
purchases by welfare recipients).
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behavior.”62 As a result, these systems limit “clients’ autonomy,
opportunity, and mobility: their ability to meet their needs in
their own ways.”63
Physical privacy is not only invaded by home searches,
but public benefits recipients may also be fingerprinted and
photographed, usually through biometric imaging.64 Moreover,
as part of child support enforcement, TANF recipients must
agree to DNA testing for themselves and their children if
paternity is contested.65
Further, TANF permits states to invade the decisional
privacy of welfare mothers in order to control their behavior to
align with middle-class norms.66 While the law governing
decisional privacy is outside the scope of this article (it involves
reproductive rights and family autonomy), it overlaps with data
collection because the state transmits its behavioral expectations
to poor mothers during the application and certification stages of
public benefits programs.67 The most controversial of these sexual
regulation policies is the imposition of family caps.68 Typically,
family caps provide no cash benefit increases for any children
conceived while the mother is on welfare.69 Several jurisdictions
have also pushed “Norplant” bonuses, which cover the cost of
62

Torin Monahan, Surveillance and Inequality, 5 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 217

(2008).
Eubanks, supra note 49, at 90-91.
See Nina Bernstein, Experts Doubt New York Plan to Fingerprint for
Medicaid, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2000, at B1 (listing states that fingerprint welfare
recipients); see also HOLCOMB ET AL., supra note 53, at 3-1 to 3-25 (explaining that
Dallas, TX and New York, NY use fingerprinting and photographing to screen public
benefit recipients); Murray, supra note 21, at 39-40.
65 42 U.S.C. § 654(29)(C) (2006).
66 See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 25, at 282-315 (describing and
critiquing the “family values” provisions of TANF).
67 See Anita L. Allen, Taking Liberties, Privacy, Private Choice, and Social
Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 461, 461-63 (1987) (defending and defining concept
of decisional privacy); Bridges, supra note 52, at 135-48 (tracing development of
Supreme Court jurisprudence on decisional privacy); Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the
Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 847-49
(2000) (describing feminist and legal conceptions of decisional privacy); Linda C.
McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 119, 124-50 (1992)
(describing development of Supreme Court case law on decisional privacy and how it
relates to poor women); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Synergy of Equality and Privacy
in Women’s Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 137, 147-52 (describing connections between
equality and decisional privacy rights).
68 See Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary
Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121, 173-77 (2002).
Slightly less than half the states have adopted a family cap. Id. at 174.
69 See Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their Coercive
Effects and Damaging Consequences, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 165-67 (2006). In
states with the family cap, about nine percent of the caseload has been impacted by the
family cap policies, resulting in about twenty percent less in cash assistance per family.
Id. at 170-71.
63
64
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implanted, long-term contraceptive devices for welfare mothers,
sometimes with an additional cash award.70 In addition, many
states bestow upon welfare mothers unsolicited family-planning
advice in the form of counseling sessions, family-planning
classes, pamphlets, and encouragement to give their children up
for adoption.71 In short, poor women seeking public benefits face
limitations across multiple dimensions of privacy.
2. Low-Wage Workplace
Low-wage
workers—currently
one-third
of
the
workforce—are workers whose wages are so low that full-time
work does not push them over the poverty line.72 Immigrants,
single mothers, and African-Americans are disproportionately
represented among low-wage workers.73 They are concentrated
in the service sector, often working in retail, as custodians, as
care providers for children and the disabled, and as security
guards.74 The service sector uses the widest range of surveillance
techniques. With modern technology, employers can log
computer keystrokes, listen to telephone calls, review e-mails
and Internet usage, conduct drug tests, employ mystery
shoppers, watch closed-circuit television, track employee
movements through GPS or radio frequency devices, and require
psychometric tests.75 Yet the uses of the data generated by these
tactics “are not made clear to employees, policies outlining their
use are not in place, and information practices are not subject to
any third-party audits or checks.”76
While there are ample studies and recommendations
about employer surveillance in the white collar workforce, the
low-wage workforce remains mostly ignored by privacy
scholars. Due to the lack of study, much evidence about
surveillance practices in the low-wage workforce is anecdotal.
In the best-selling book Nickled and Dimed, author Barbara
Ehrenreich went undercover in a series of low-wage jobs such
70 See Smith, supra note 69, at 168-69; see also Bridgewater, supra note 21, at
404-05 (arguing that the state’s coercive use of Norplant to hinder the reproductive
rights of African-American women violates the Thirteenth Amendment).
71 See Smith, supra note 68, at 169, 177-81.
72 PAMELA J. LOPREST ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WHO ARE
LOW-WAGE WORKERS? ASPE RESEARCH BRIEF (2009), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/
hsp/09/LowWageWorkers/rb.pdf.
73 Michael Selmi, Unions, Education, and the Future of Low-Wage Workers,
2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 147, 151-52.
74 LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 329 (2009).
75 Kristie Ball, Workplace Surveillance: An Overview, 51 LAB. HIST. 87, 88-90 (2010).
76 Id. at 91.

2012]

THE CLASS DIFFERENTIAL IN PRIVACY LAW

1401

as a diner waitress, nursing home attendant, cleaning woman,
and Wal-Mart salesperson.77 Throughout the book, she explains
how each job was physically and mentally demanding as well
as financially draining, given the costs of housing, food, and
lengthy commutes.
The jobs were also privacy-stripping. Of all the workforce
indignities, Ehrenreich was most surprised and offended at the
loss of self-respect engendered in low-wage jobs.78 For instance,
as a waitress, Ehrenreich “was warned that my purse could be
searched by management at any time.”79 She remarks that
“[d]rug testing is another routine indignity. . . . In some testing
protocols, the employee has to strip to her underwear and pee
into a cup in the presence of an aide or technician.”80 Ehrenreich
also found pre-employment personality tests demeaning; they
include “questions about your ‘moods of self-pity,’ whether you
are a loner or believe you are usually misunderstood.”81
Reflecting on these intrusions, she states, “It is unsettling, at the
very least, to give a stranger access to things, like your selfdoubts and your urine, that are otherwise shared only in
medical or therapeutic situations.”82
Ehrenreich’s experience appears widespread in the lowwage workforce. For instance, a study of Latina nannies found
that they escaped the isolation of their jobs by congregating with
other nannies in public parks.83 Thus, when their employers
came to the park to check on their children, the nannies felt that
it signaled a lack of trust.84 Whereas the nannies wanted
autonomy to do their jobs, these visits transformed the park
from “the nannies’ space into another site of surveillance”
similar to the employers’ homes.85 For these workers, a public
space was a private refuge, which demonstrates the contextspecific nature of privacy and how it promotes values of dignity
and autonomy. In other words, domestic workers sometimes have
too much “bad” privacy (they work isolated in someone else’s
home) and not enough “good” privacy (ability to work and live
77 BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKLED AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN
AMERICA (2001).
78 Id. at 208.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 209.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Armada Ameta, Creating Community: Latina Nannies in a West Los
Angeles Park, 32 QUALITATIVE. SOC. 279, 279 (2009).
84 Id. at 289.
85 Id. at 290.
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with some measure of respect and independence).86 For domestic
workers, privacy can be hard to come by, even as they are
expected to respect the privacy of their employers by discreetly
staying out of sight.87 Moreover, their working conditions are
negotiated in the privacy of the employer’s home, where the
bargaining differential is pronounced and where workers are
susceptible to abuse.88
Migrant farmworkers also face an alarming lack of
privacy, as they live in employer-provided housing.89 David
Shipler describes a North Carolina barracks used to house
migrant workers during sweet potato season, in which up to
fourteen men live in a room that measures twelve by fifteen
feet with no opportunity for solitude.90
These sorts of class differentials are found throughout
the low-wage workforce. For most white collar workers, drug
testing is limited to situations that implicate public health or
safety.91 By contrast, drug testing is regularly part of preemployment screening for low-wage jobs.92 Routine drug testing
and location tracking via satellite positioning devices are also
most prevalent in jobs with the lowest status and salaries.93
Likewise, “[t]he majority of employees being electronically
monitored are women in low-paying clerical positions.”94
Similarly, pre-employment psychological tests—commonly called
86 See Joy M. Zarembka, America’s Dirty Work: Migrant Maids and Modern
Day Slavery, in GLOBAL WOMAN: NANNIES, MAIDS, AND SEX WORKERS IN THE NEW
ECONOMY 142, 142 (Barbara Ehrenreich & Arlie Russell Hochschild eds., 2002)
(describing the isolation and dangers faced by domestic workers). This is true for home
health care attendants as well, who are supposed to be “invisible” to foster the
independence of those for whom they care. See Lynn Mae Rivas, Invisible Labors:
Caring for the Independent Person, in GLOBAL WOMAN, supra, at 70, 72-74.
87 See MARY ROMERO, MAID IN THE U.S.A. 147 (2002). Speaking about live-in
maids, Romero writes: “The combination of not having a bedroom and not having
access to the rest of the house for resting or leisure activity continually affirms the
worker’s inferior status in the employer’s home.” Id.
88 Id. at 129.
89 DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: INVISIBLE IN AMERICA 98-99 (2004).
90 Id. at 98 (“its configuration could have had no purpose other than to house
workers—and to deprive them of their dignity”).
91 Nancy D. Campbell, Everyday Insecurities: The Microbehavioral Politics of
Intrusive Surveillance, in SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY, supra note 49, at 65.
92 Id. at 66.
93 KENNETH D. TUNNELL, PISSING ON DEMAND: WORKPLACE DRUG TESTING AND
THE RISE OF THE DETOX INDUSTRY 24 (2004) (“The body of evidence clearly shows that
social class and income are inversely related to drug testing; working-class members with
the lowest incomes are those most likely to be subjected to drug testing.”).
94 Paul S. Greenlaw & Cornelia Prundeanu, The Impact of Federal Legislation
to Limit Electronic Monitoring, 26 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT., Summer 1997, at 227, 229,
available
at
http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/9707093594/impact-federallegislation-limit-electronic-monitoring.
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honesty tests—are concentrated in the “retail, fast food,
banking, and other service industries,” even though “their
accuracy and predictive value are doubted.”95
Many low-wage employers use multiple methods to
control their workers. For instance, a study of workers in the
fast food and grocery industries found extensive forms of
surveillance, ranging from rows upon rows of hanging video
cameras to drug tests to honesty tests, in which applicants
were “asked about illegal behavior, such as whether they have
taken drugs or stolen anything in the past, or about the
behavior of their friends and acquaintances, such as whether
they know anyone who takes drugs or steals,” as well as
questions about how they would react in various scenarios.96
At the same time, just because “people give up
information in exchange for jobs and other valued outcomes
should not be construed as meaning that doing so is voluntary.”97
Rather, in today’s workplace, an employer has almost no
restraints on the forms and extent of surveillance it chooses to
adopt, and in today’s tight labor market, employees have little
choice but to submit.
B.

Harms and Justifications

Poor individuals, families, and communities suffer
tangible harms—psychological, material, and physical—as a
result of the class differential in privacy policies and law. These
harms are disproportionate to the justifications underlying
privacy intrusions, and yet they remain invisible to many
Americans. One privacy scholar has criticized other privacy
theorists for failing to show how “privacy violations can
negatively impact the lives of living, breathing human beings
beyond simply provoking feelings of unease.”98 She argues that
if we do not identify the harms of privacy invasions, privacy
will continue to deteriorate. Part of the apathy may be that
privacy theorists have neglected the poor. Indeed, one privacy
95 Sharona Hoffman, Preplacement Examinations and Job-Relatedness: How
to Enhance Privacy and Diminish Discrimination in the Workplace, 49 U. KAN. L. REV.
517, 540 (2001). There are almost no legal protections against these tests. Id. at 541.
96 STUART TANNOCK, YOUTH AT WORK: THE UNIONIZED FAST-FOOD AND
GROCERY WORKPLACE 47-48 (2001).
97 Eugene F. Stone-Romero et al., Personnel Selection Procedures and Invasion
of Privacy, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 343, 345 (2003).
98 Ann Bartow, Response, A Feeling of Unease About Privacy Law, 155 PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 52, 52 (2006), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/
11-2006/Bartow.pdf.
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scholar admits that “privacy is seldom a matter of life and
death;” rather, “[m]ost of the injuries caused by the misuse of
data in modern society are not particularly embarrassing or
emotionally disturbing.”99 This is not true for the poor.
For the poor, the injuries are concrete. Recent studies
within the public health field show that when the state treats
marginalized people with a lack of dignity, the results can
include “loss of respect, loss of self worth, ego, sense of self, and
soul, loss of status, social standing, and moral standing, loss of
confidence and determination.”100 There are long-term effects as
well, such as “social isolation or marginalization, a reluctance to
seek help or access resources, passivity or ‘learned helplessness,’
a ‘small’ life of constrained choices, chronically poor physical and
mental health, and a cycle of victimization and abuse, in which
the violated individual turns to violating others.”101 These are
psychological attributes that undermine the odds that poor
families will become self-sufficient,102 which is the goal of the
welfare system and, indeed, our liberal society.
1. Welfare
The welfare system of surveillance causes recipients to
suffer psychological injuries including stress, fear, and feelings
of degradation.103 While procedures such as drug tests and finger
imaging may have instrumental purposes, they also send a
degrading message to and about welfare recipients.104 This is
because these procedures have symbolic meaning within our
cultural traditions—“drug testing challenges traditions that
urination is a private affair; and finger-imaging conjures up an
image of criminality.”105 These procedures “freeze a moment in
time while ignoring the ongoing context of inequality and
structural violence.”106 Not only is the subject’s dignity
degraded by these procedures, but society also receives a
message that “reinforce[s] negative stereotypes of the
Nehf, supra note 1, at 30.
Nora Jacobson, A Taxonomy of Dignity: A Grounded Theory Study, 9 INT’L
HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 3, 7 (2009).
101 Id.
102 See generally Joaquina Palomar Lever et al., Poverty, Psychological Resources
and Subjective Well-Being, 73 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 375 (2005) (describing how certain
psychological attributes help people cope with poverty, while others are harmful).
103 See GILLIOM, supra note 37, at 66-67, 78 (summarizing interviews with
welfare recipients in Appalachia in the early 1990s).
104 Murray, supra note 21, at 40.
105 Id.
106 Campbell, supra note 91, at 72.
99

100
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targets.”107 In turn, these stereotypes drive punitive laws
directed at the poor.
Not surprisingly, the privacy deprivations and
humiliations associated with welfare discourage many needy
women from seeking assistance.108 Without state assistance,
these nonentrants to the TANF system and their children often
lack adequate resources for food, shelter, and other basic
needs⎯even if they are working. Studies have shown that
nonentrants struggle to make ends meet by juggling a shifting
array of nonpublic resources and that this hardship negatively
impacts their health.109 In short, accepting welfare can subject
one to humiliation, but refusing it can result in hunger. This
“choice” hardly promotes autonomy or dignity.
Further, mandatory child support cooperation policies
can result in the unintentional perpetuation of domestic
violence.110 Battered women are overrepresented in the TANF
population.111 To reduce the dangers of exacerbating domestic
violence through reporting requirements, TANF attempts to
protect victims by allowing states to grant these victims an
exemption from the cooperation requirement.112 Yet many
eligible women are not claiming the exemption for a variety of
reasons, including the public setting of the welfare office, fear
that child welfare authorities may take their children, stringent
requirements for independent corroboration, and feelings of
humiliation and embarrassment.113 As a result, the paternity
Murray, supra note 21, at 42.
See ROBERT MOFFITT ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A STUDY OF
TANF NON-ENTRANTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
PLANNING AND EVALUATION 2, 14 (2003) (new welfare reform policies discourage
participation). “[Many] non-entrants in our study felt that applying for TANF was an
unpleasant, time-consuming experience that resulted in little financial benefit. . . . Many
felt the application process to be overly intrusive.” Id. at 20 (Part B).
109 Id. at 45. One study found that:
107
108

mothers jeopardized their own health and well-being when trying to provide
for their families by taking on second, third, and fourth jobs, working odd
hours, or commuting long distances via public transportation. . . . [Moreover,
i]n order to acquire and maintain affordable housing, many families were
forced to live in unsafe neighborhoods. . . . [And finally, m]others with young
children consistently had trouble securing stable care for [their children.]
Id.
110 Susan
Notar & Vicki Turetsky, Models for Safe Child Support
Enforcement, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 657, 664 (2000).
111 See Smith, supra note 68, at 153-54 (although batterers come from all social
classes, TANF clients are especially vulnerable because they have fewer economic supports).
112 42 U.S.C. § 602 (2006). State implementation varies widely, and most state
policies are not adequate to protect battered women. See Smith, supra note 68, at 158.
113 See Smith, supra note 68, at 165-66; Notar & Turetsky, supra note 110, at 672-76.
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disclosure required by the child support system poses a
substantial risk to domestic violence victims for very little
benefit. After all, these mothers do not receive any of the child
support checks that are collected; rather, the state keeps the
money to repay itself for the costs of welfare.114 Notably, TANF
recipients lack the decisional autonomy of nonpoor single
mothers, who are “not forced to identify, marry, live with, seek
support from, or interact with the biological father.”115
Fraud prevention is the usual justification underlying
welfare surveillance.116 For welfare mothers, this translates
into home visits, fingerprinting, and elaborate third-party
verification schemes. However, there is scant data on welfare
fraud, even though states presume it is widespread.117 To be
sure, there are applicants who do not report all sources of
income. Because it is impossible to survive on welfare benefits
(the average monthly benefit for a family of three is $363),118
some welfare applicants accept support from family members
or earn additional income from jobs such as babysitting or
cutting hair.119 Welfare mothers are in a bind—they must earn
unreported income to provide for their children, but this
conduct is considered “fraud.” Thus, in some cases, the state’s
low welfare stipends and rigid earning limits create the very
fraud that the state seeks to eliminate.
Further, studies show that women convicted of welfare
fraud sometimes fail to report income for circumstances out of
their control, such as when their partners hide their income or
force them to keep it secret.120 In addition, many cases of fraud
are unintentional and occur when welfare applicants either do not
understand the complex income and resource reporting rules of

114 See Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating
the Best Interests of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1029, 1045 (2007).
115 See Smith, supra note 68, at 140. Non-welfare families can use child
support enforcement services, but they can withdraw on a voluntary basis. See Notar &
Turetsky, supra note 110, at 671.
116 See Gustafson, supra note 59, at 658-61, 674-81, 683-88 (describing how
fraud concerns have spurred the criminalization of welfare).
117 Murray, supra note 21, at 50 (“There is little systematic information on the
form of welfare fraud known as double-dipping.”).
118 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMINISTRATION ON CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES: SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 75 (2006).
119 See GILLIOM, supra note 37, at 67, 100; see also KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA
LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE
WORK 168 (1997).
120 Richelle S. Swan et al., The Untold Story of Welfare Fraud, 35 J. SOC. &
SOC. WELFARE 133, 140 (2008).
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TANF, or are misinformed by their caseworkers.121 The jobs
obtained by welfare mothers tend to be unstable with fluctuating
schedules and incomes, which can also lead to reporting problems
when anticipated and actual income differ.122 “In short, the U.S.
system both produces and punishes lawbreakers.”123 Better clarity
in welfare rules and improved training of caseworkers could go far
in fixing the sorts of errors that get mislabeled as intentional fraud.
Still, fraud is grossly overstated in welfare programs,
making the draconian methods for rooting out fraud unreasonably
invasive. For instance, New York City began fingerprinting welfare
applicants in 1995 in an effort to root out imagined fraud.124
However, out of 148,000 recipients, the city found only forty-three
cases of double dipping.125 Even purveyors of electronic fraud
detection systems have admitted that fraud is extremely rare.126
Moreover, studies suggest welfare fraud is no more rampant in
welfare than in other government programs,127 which are not
subject to the same withering scrutiny. “The government takes a
far greater risk on graduate student loans, for example, than on
any welfare recipient.”128 Yet graduate students do not have their
homes searched and are not fingerprinted.
Similarly, the annual cost of tax fraud, including
underreporting and offshore tax shelters, is immense, but
nevertheless is not considered “morally indecent.”129 Because the
government can root out welfare double-dipping by computerized
121 Id. at 140, 143. In turn, convictions for fraud leave these women with
serious collateral consequences, such as inability to pass screenings for housings,
credit, or employment. Id.
122 Id. at 140.
123 Gustafson, supra note 59, at 681.
124 Preston L. Morgan, Note, Public Assistance for the Price of Privacy: Leaving
the Door Open on Welfare Home Searches, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 227, 251 (2009).
125 Id.
126 See, e.g., Joshua Dean, Texas Nears Rollout of Fingerprint System, FED.
COMPUTER WEEK (Aug. 5, 1999), http://fcw.com/articles/1999/08/05/texas-nears-rollout-offingerprint-system.aspx (official from private contractor states that out of 700,000 people
fingerprinted for public benefits, twelve cases were referred for further investigation).
127 See Mulzer, supra note 56, at 688-89 (“[F]ear of fraud has always played a
larger role in the administration of public benefits programs than it realistically should
have.”); Julilly Kohler-Hausman, “The Crime of Survival”: Fraud Prosecutions, Community
Surveillance, and the Original “Welfare Queen,” 41 J. SOC. HIST. 329, 343 (2007) (“[M]uch of
what became defined as fraud were simply attempts to supplement welfare grants with
additional income from low wage work or living with another wage earner.”).
128 David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK.
L. REV. 231, 249 (1988).
129 Donald Crump, Criminals Don’t Pay: Using Tax Fraud to Prohibit
Organized Crime, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 386, 397 (2009); see also Eric A. Posner,
Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV 1781, 1783-84
(2000) (stating that “the audit rate is currently under 2%, and of those audited only a
small fraction (4.1% in 1995) are penalized”).
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matching of welfare applicants against social security numbers,
more intrusive measures such as fingerprinting, photographing,
and home visits serve only to stigmatize recipients.130 In addition,
welfare surveillance has societal consequences, because it
reduces democratic participation by welfare recipients.131
Obviously, a government program must ensure that the proper
persons are receiving the appropriate levels of benefits. Further,
welfare caseworkers cannot link welfare recipients to available
social services without information about their needs. However,
the level of information required from TANF applicants goes far
beyond what is necessary to meet these goals and is often
gathered through demeaning techniques.
2. The Low-Wage Workplace
The privacy losses suffered by low-income employees can
cause humiliation, shame, and stigma. After working a series of
low-wage jobs, Barbara Ehrenreich concluded: “If you are
treated as an untrustworthy person—a potential slacker, drug
addict, or thief—you may begin to feel less trustworthy
yourself.”132 Psychological research confirms that “workplace
humiliation can itself be as devastating as the physical or
economic harms that are legally actionable in employment and
other settings.”133 Moreover, “women, minorities, and some
‘outsider’ groups” suffer disproportionate levels of humiliation.134
In the employment context, surveillance serves many
purposes. Employers use monitoring to deter theft, protect
proprietary information, guard against lawsuits, discourage
improper conduct, and monitor work performance.135 These are
legitimate objectives. At the same time, social scientists who
study the workplace generally conclude that employer
surveillance tactics are overly broad to accomplish these goals,
with damaging effects on employees’ stress levels.136 For
130
131
132
133

Gustafson, supra note 59, at 677 n.153.
See infra notes 373-82 and accompanying text.
EHRENREICH, supra note 77, at 210.
Catherine L. Fisk, Humiliation at Work, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 73,

76 (2001).
Id.
See Frank J. Cavico, Invasion of Privacy in the Private Employment Sector:
Tortious and Ethical Aspects, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1263, 1287-88 (1993); Robert Sprague,
Orwell Was an Optimist: The Evolution of Privacy in the United States and its DeEvolution for American Employees, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 83, 111-12 (2008).
136 See D. Scott Kiker & Mary Kiker, A Quantitative Review of Organizational
Outcomes Related to Electronic Performance Monitoring, 11 BUS. REV. 295, 300 (2008)
(analyzing research studies of electronic performance monitoring).
134
135
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instance, a prominent two-year study of telecommunications
employees who worked in directory assistance, as service
representatives, and in clerical jobs linked employee monitoring
to headaches, backaches, wrist pains, greater fatigue, a 12
percent increase in depression, and a 15 percent increase in
extreme anxiety.137 Other studies confirm that a variety of
health problems can flow from employer surveillance “such as
stress, high tension, headaches, extreme anxiety, depression,
anger, severe fatigue, and musculoskeletal problems.”138
Moreover, the consequences of stress are magnified in jobs
where employees lack control over their privacy or a voice in
establishing monitoring procedures.139
Employers also pay a cost. At the outset of the
employment relationship, invasive application procedures can
limit the pool of eligible applicants, as they perceive a lack of trust
from potential employers.140 This distrust may disproportionately
impact the disabled as well as racial and ethnic minorities who
“may fear that they will be stigmatized unfairly by the
information revealed by various selection procedures.”141
The corporate bottom line can also suffer from decreased
employee productivity and creativity, low morale, diminished
trust, and high turnover caused by intrusive monitoring.142
Extreme surveillance can increase employee resistance.143 For
instance, a study of call centers found that workers
137 M.J. Smith et al., Employee Stress and Health Complaints in Jobs With and
Without Electronic Performance Monitoring, 23 APPLIED ERGONOMICS 17, 23-27 (1992).
138 Scott C. D’Urso, Who’s Watching Us at Work? Toward a StructuralPerceptual Model of Electronic Monitoring and Surveillance in Organizations, 16
COMM. THEORY 281, 287 (2006).
139 See Stone-Romero et al., supra note 97, at 346. By contrast, “monitored
participants who were given the opportunity to voice their opinions about the design
and implementation of monitoring systems had higher perceptions of procedural
justice.” Laurel A. McNall & Sylvia G. Roch, A Social Exchange Model of Employee
Reactions to Electronic Performance Monitoring, 22 HUMAN PERFORMANCE 204, 205
(2009); see also A.F. Westin, Two Key Factors That Belong in a Macroergonomic
Analysis of Electronic Monitoring: Employee Perceptions of Fairness and the Climate of
Organizational Trust or Distrust, 23 APPLIED ERGONOMICS 35, 35-42 (1992). Likewise,
monitoring can be beneficial when it results in productive feedback to employees. See
David Holman, Phoning in Sick? An Overview of Employee Stress in Call Centres, 24
LEADERSHIP & ORG. DEV. J. 123, 128 (2003).
140 Stone-Romero et al., supra note 97, at 351, 364. A study found that
employees consider the most invasive procedures to be lie detector tests, drug tests,
medical examinations, background checks, and honesty tests. Id. at 363.
141 Id. at 364.
142 See D’Urso, supra note 138, at 287; Ball, supra note 75, at 93.
143 See Ball, supra note 75, at 94 (citing George Callahan & Paul Thompson,
We Recruit Attitude: The Selection and Shaping of Routine Call Centre Labour, 39 J.
MGMT. STUD. 233 (2002); Stephen Frankel et al., Beyond Bureaucracy? Work
Organization in Call Centres, 9 INT’L J. HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 957 (1998)).
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circumvented surveillance by pretending to talk on the phone,
leaving call lines open without a customer on the line, and
misleading customers, among other tactics.144
Studies also show that privacy intrusions can inhibit
organizational citizenship, defined as “discretionary behavior that
promotes effective organizational functioning but is not formally
recognized by reward systems.”145 Surveillance can also lessen
communication within an organization because there is less need
for managers to interact with surveilled employees.146 In turn, less
communication “may lower productivity, limit the development of
important informal organizational networks, and prevent
employees from exchanging key job-related information.”147
By contrast, “information privacy [is] directly associated
with psychological empowerment,” as well as “a greater
willingness [on the part of employees] to engage in behaviors that
help the organization.”148 For instance, Federal Express
implemented a successful monitoring program of call center
employees by including their input into setting work standards,
promoting trust, and providing a comfortable work environment.149
In sum, both workers and employers pay hidden costs as a result
of unfair and intrusive employee monitoring.
II.

PRIVACY, POVERTY, AND THE LAW

This part surveys the legal system’s regulation of
privacy for low-income people. It concludes that privacy law
does not protect the poor. As a constitutional matter, the
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard provides scant
protection because our society has long deemed it reasonable to
intrude upon the lives of the poor. As a statutory matter, our
laws focus on ensuring against the misuse of data, which is a
middle-class priority, rather than data collection, which tends
144 Id. Obviously, these forms of resistance are not good for a corporate
bottom-line. Yet resistance is an inevitable response to surveillance systems; as Gary
Marx writes, “[S]urveillance targets often have space to maneuver and can use countertechnologies. . . . Humans are wonderfully inventive at finding ways to beat control
systems and to avoid observation.” Gary T. Marx, A Tack in the Shoe: Neutralizing and
Resisting the New Surveillance, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 369, 372 (2003).
145 Bradley J. Alge et al., Information Privacy in Organizations: Empowering
Creative and Extrarole Performance, 91 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 221, 221, 223 (2006); see also
Myria Watkins Allen et al., Workplace Surveillance and Managing Privacy Boundaries,
21 MGMT. COMM. Q. 172, 192 (2007) (“High levels of surveillance can damage trust,
leading to a less efficient workforce . . . and other costly consequences for organizations.”).
146 See Allen et al., supra note 145, at 193.
147 Id.
148 Alge et al., supra note 145, at 228.
149 Westin, supra note 136, at 300.
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to stigmatize the poor. As a common law matter, the law is
geared toward elite concerns about reputation rather than the
humiliation that surveillance causes to low-income Americans.
At bottom, the core principle of privacy law⎯the “right to
be left alone”⎯ill-fits the needs of low-income Americans. Their
vulnerable economic status leaves these citizens dependent on
government assistance, which inevitably entails an ongoing
relationship between the citizen and the state. Likewise, an
employment relationship is necessarily continuing and
interactive. Yet privacy is like an on/off switch; you either have
it or you don’t. Privacy law does not account for intertwined
relationships between citizens and larger institutional actors.
A.

Constitutional Privacy Rights

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects
citizens from unreasonable searches by the state.150 In addition,
the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to
information privacy, which protects certain personal information
from government disclosure.151 However, these constitutional
privacy protections are applied differently to the poor than to
their wealthier counterparts. As this part explains, this
differential arises from an ingrained bias against the poor.
1. Fourth Amendment
Fourth
Amendment
privacy
hinges
upon
reasonableness.152 In assessing government searches, courts
balance the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy against
the government’s rationale for the intrusion. This test is widely
criticized as malleable and overly favorable to the
government.153 Moreover, encroaching technology has put
personal information in the public square. The resulting
dilemma is that when everyday expectations of privacy
diminish, it becomes less reasonable to expect the government
to respect individual privacy.154

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See infra text accompanying notes 199-207.
152 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
153 See, e.g., John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth
Amendment, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 655, 656 (calling the Supreme Court’s reasonableness
standard “just about the most unhelpful guidepost one could have concocted”).
154 See Scott Sundby, Everyman’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual
Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1761 (1994).
150
151
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held steadfast to
the principle that people have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their home.155 Based on the deep-rooted AngloAmerican maxim that “a man’s home is his castle,”156 the Court
has drawn “a firm line at the entrance to the house,”157 stating
that “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which
the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”158 The
Court’s “housing exceptionalism”159 is consistent with empirical
research showing that people rate searches of bedrooms and
home interiors as highly intrusive.160 The Court’s property-based
conception of privacy therefore favors property owners.161 By
contrast, the Supreme Court has held that a person who seeks
government assistance gives up her rights to privacy, even in
her home.162 The Court thus “define[s] privacy in a way that
makes people who are less well-off more likely to experience
warrantless, suspicionless government intrusions.”163
a. Home Visits
The primary case demonstrating this discrepancy is the
1971 case of Wyman v. James, in which the Court upheld home
visits by welfare officials, reasoning that the visits were not
searches covered by the Fourth Amendment because they were
consensual.164 Of course, one can question whether someone
who is hungry and who would otherwise be homeless without
public benefits can truly consent in a voluntary manner.
Nevertheless, the Court applied a rational basis standard,
ruling that even if the home visits were searches, they were
reasonable given the state’s interest in deterring fraud, the
155 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“‘At the very core’ of the
Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’” (citations omitted)).
156 Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home Is His Castle?”: Reflections on the
Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth
Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 180, 198-99 (2002).
157 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
158 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
159 Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the
Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 908 (2010).
160 Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at
“Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 739 (1993).
161 See Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment,
55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 401 (2003).
162 Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971); see also infra text
accompanying notes 164-72.
163 Slobogin, supra note 161, at 400.
164 400 U.S. at 317-18.
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need to protect the children of welfare mothers, the
rehabilitative purpose of the searches, and the lack of criminal
consequences that flowed from the searches.165 In finding that
the privacy deprivations were negligible, the Wyman Court
disregarded affidavits from twelve aid recipients alleging that
the unannounced visits were not only embarrassing when
guests were in the home, but also when personal questions
were asked in front of their children.166 In silencing the voices
of poor women, the Court ignored the social context in which
these women live and mistakenly equated forced consent with
free choice. Moreover, the Court’s disregard of their voices is
inconsistent with psychological and sociological research
showing that people value home privacy because it protects
interpersonal relationships.167
The Wyman Court further intimated, based on Ms.
James’s social services case file (and not evidence adduced at
trial), that Ms. James’s son had been physically abused and
bitten by rats, concluding that “[t]he picture is a sad and
unhappy one.”168 The Court’s clear assumption was that poor,
single women are terrible mothers who warrant suspicion and
distrust. Throughout the opinion, the Court also expressed its
distaste for Ms. James and how she ran her household.169 The
Court disliked her “attitude,” “evasiveness,” and “belligerency”—
all of which arose from her resistance to the state and her
entirely reasonable belief that the state could verify her
eligibility through personal interviews and documents.170 Her
request was simply to be treated the same as other
beneficiaries of governmental largesse. As Justice Douglas
remarked in dissent, “No such sums are spent policing the
government subsidies granted to farmers, airlines, steamship
companies, and junk mail dealers, to name but a few.”171
Because the poor are not a protected class under the
Fourteenth Amendment, equality law arguments based on
class will likely be insufficient.172 Legislation that discriminates
Id. at 318-24.
Id. at 320 n.8.
167 Stern, supra note 159, at 940. Search activity in the home can “disrupt
domestic life, engender interpersonal conflict, reveal personal information that is
private to and constitutive of relationships, and chill socialization and intimacy.” Id.
168 400 U.S. at 322 n.9.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 332 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting J. Skelly Wright, Poverty,
Minorities, and Respect for Law, 425 DUKE L.J. 425, 437-38 (1970)).
172 See Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty
Law, Dual Rules of Law & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 630 (2008).
165
166
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against or burdens the poor is reviewed under a lenient
rational basis standard.173
In 2006, in Sanchez v. San Diego, the Ninth Circuit
reaffirmed the current validity of Wyman, when it ruled that
Project 100% (discussed in the Introduction) was
constitutional.174 The court expressly lumped welfare mothers
with criminals on probation to conclude that neither group has a
reasonable expectation to privacy.175 In holding that Wyman was
governing precedent, the Sanchez Court refused to recognize
differences between the Wyman home visits and those of San
Diego’s Project 100%. Key to the Wyman holding was the Court’s
view that the social worker visits at issue were
“rehabilitative.”176 By contrast, Project 100% is “expressly
investigatory in nature, with no rehabilitative or service
component,” and is carried out by law enforcement fraud
investigators.177
Moreover, the Sanchez Court disregarded thirty years of
post-Wyman jurisprudence, which has significantly limited
suspicionless, administrative searches.178 Under current law, a
warrant and probable cause are not required for administrative
searches that are driven by “special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement.”179 Yet this special needs doctrine
applies only where public safety is at issue, such as in drug
testing of railroad employees and federal customs agents, or
where necessary to protect the health and safety of public school
students under a loco parentis theory.180 Nevertheless, the
Sanchez Court wedged welfare home visits into the special needs
category, even though welfare is not an issue of public safety.
Despite the evolution of thirty years of Fourth
Amendment law, courts in other states have also upheld TANF
home visits, leading Jordan Budd to conclude that “the law
actually matters little; the poor, presumptively different, inhabit
their own constitutional universe.”181 The adherence to Wyman
is all the more indefensible given how welfare has changed since
173 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (holding that rational
basis review applies to economic regulation).
174 464 F.3d 916, 916 (9th Cir. 2006), reh’g en banc denied, 483 F.3d 965 (2007).
175 Id. at 927.
176 Wyman, 400 U.S. at 319-20.
177 Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional
Status and the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 355, 387 (2010).
178 Id.
179 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (citation omitted).
180 Budd, supra note 177, at 398.
181 Id. at 403-04.
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the 1970s, when it was a means-tested program that came under
attack for encouraging welfare dependency.182 Since 1996,
welfare recipients have not only been subject to a five-year
lifetime limit on receipt of benefits, but they also must work as a
condition of receiving aid.183 They are fulfilling their part of this
new social contract, but the terms still include humiliation and
stigma.
b. Drug Testing
Welfare recipients have fared somewhat better in
challenging state-mandated drug testing, which is expressly
authorized in TANF.184 However, their victory here is tenuous
and may be short-lived. In 2000, the district court in
Marchwinski v. Howard struck down a Michigan law
authorizing suspicionless drug testing of TANF applicants.185
The court stated that although the state’s professed need to
address substance abuse as a barrier to employment was
“laudable and understandable,” it was not a public safety issue
and thus, did not justify dispensing with the ordinary Fourth
Amendment requirement of individualized suspicion.186 The
court rejected the state’s argument that a “special need” arose
from its interest in protecting children from drug abusing
parents, explaining that TANF is not directed at child abuse or
neglect.187 Thus, the TANF program “cannot be used to regulate
the parents in a manner that erodes their privacy rights in order
to further goals that are unrelated to the welfare program.”188 In
so holding, the district court refused to allow governmental
assistance to become an unlimited tool for social control.
By contrast, the initial Sixth Circuit panel concluded on
appeal that welfare mothers have a diminished expectation of
privacy because “welfare assistance is a very heavily regulated

182 See WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY
SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 362-85 (6th ed. 1999) (describing attacks on AFDC
that lead to enactment of TANF).
183 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) (work requirement); id. § 608(a)(7) (five
year limit).
184 21 U.S.C. § 862b (2006).
185 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000). The decision was overturned by the
Sixth Circuit, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), but subsequently the en banc court split evenly
on the issue, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003). Under Sixth Circuit rules, the split resulted in
an affirmance of the district court’s opinion. 60 F. App’x 601, 601 (6th Cir. 2003).
186 Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1140.
187 Id. at 1142.
188 Id.
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area of public life.”189 In reversing the district court, the Sixth
Circuit identified two public safety justifications for conducting
a suspicionless search: (1) the need to protect children from
abuse by drug-addicted welfare mothers; and (2) the need to
protect the public from the crime associated with illicit drug
use and trafficking.190 This reasoning ignores empirical
evidence that the use of illicit drugs by welfare recipients is no
greater than in the U.S. population at large.191 The appellate
court also found that there was a “special need” to protect the
public fisc from abuse.192 Yet under this expansive reasoning,
“the simple receipt of a tax deduction, credit, or subsidy
empowers the state to conduct warrantless and suspicionless
searches to verify that the beneficiary does not use the funds to
buy contraband.”193 Of course, this reasoning can justify drug
testing on all Americans, but the government is unlikely to use
such strategies on middle-class Americans.
On en banc review of the court of appeals decision, the
Sixth Circuit split evenly, leaving the result of the district
court opinion intact⎯for now.194 Across the country, state
legislatures have expressed a renewed interest in suspicionless
drug testing of welfare recipients,195 and Florida recently
implemented drug testing for all welfare applicants.196 Some
congresspersons have even suggested drug testing for recipients
of unemployment insurance.197 As the class of economically
stressed Americans grows, so do calls for increased public drug
testing programs. The stigma of drug testing is a way to
discourage the needy from seeking assistance. It diverts attention
Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 337.
Id. at 335-36.
191 Budd, supra note 21, at 776-77.
192 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 337.
193 Budd, supra note 21, at 799.
194 Marchwinski v. Howard, 60 F. App’x 601, 601 (6th Cir. 2003).
195 See, e.g., Chris L. Jenkins, Bill Would Require Some to Pass Drug Test to
Get Aid, WASH. POST., Feb. 19, 2008, at B5 (discussing proposed bill in Virginia, as well
as efforts in Kentucky and Arizona); Budd, supra note 21, at 754 (“[O]ver half of the
states have considered legislation linking the receipt of public assistance to mandatory
screening for drug use.”).
196 Florida: Welfare Recipients Face Drug Tests, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2011, at
A18. A federal district court judge enjoined implementation of the law. Lebron v.
Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2011). In 2011, Missouri and Arizona passed
bills requiring welfare drug testing of suspected drug users. See Drug Testing and
Public Assistance, NCSL.ORG, available at http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?
tabid=23676 (last updated Oct. 7, 2011). In all, thirty-six states in 2011 considered
drug testing laws for various forms of public benefits. See id.
197 See Vicki Needham, House Republicans Propose Drug Testing for Unemployment
Benefits, HILL (Dec. 9, 2011, 1:08 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/801-economy/
198441-house-republicans-propose-drug-testing-for-unemployment-benefits.
189
190
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away from systemic problems underlying the modern economy
and towards the private behavior of citizens. It allows the
government to wash its hands of need.
2. Informational Privacy Under the Constitution
The Supreme Court has suggested there might be a
right to informational privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s substantive due process clause, although the
contours of this right remain murky.198 The right appears to
protect against disclosure of personal information to third
parties, rather than its collection, and as a result, it provides
scant protection for the poor.
The Court’s most recent articulation of this right
occurred in 2011 in NASA v. Nelson,199 which involved twentyeight employees, including scientists, engineers, and
administrators, who worked for the Jet Propulsion Laboratories
at the California Institute of Technology pursuant to a contract
with the National Aeronautics Space Agency (NASA).200 In 2007,
NASA began requiring that these workers submit to a
background investigation, regularly used for federal workers,
that asks whether they have used, possessed, manufactured or
sold drugs in the past year, and if so, if they received drug
counseling or treatment in the past year, and that also asks a
wide range of personal references if they have any reason to
believe that the employee is unsuited for federal work.201
Failure to comply with the background investigation results in
termination of employment.202 The employees at issue were all
classified as “non-sensitive” employees for security purposes,
and thus claimed that the background investigation violated
their constitutional right to information privacy.203 The Ninth
198 NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 756 (2011) (assuming without deciding
that there is a constitutional informational privacy right).
199 Id. at 746. Prior to Nelson, the only Court precedent on point dated from
other thirty years ago. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977), the Court recognized
“an individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” Id. at 599. Still, the
Court in Whalen held that New York State could maintain a centralized computer file
containing the names and addresses of all persons who obtained legal prescriptions for
Schedule II drugs, which are drugs that have both legitimate and illegal uses. Id. at
591. In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977), the Court held
that despite an information privacy right, President Nixon could not prevent
government archivists from reviewing his papers because there were adequate
protections against dissemination and the intrusion was limited. Id. at 455-65.
200 131 S. Ct. at 752.
201 Id. at 752-53.
202 Id. at 752.
203 Id. at 752, 754.
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Circuit agreed and enjoined the investigations, reasoning that
the requested information was not narrowly tailored to the
government’s interests in a drug free and secure workplace.204
The Supreme Court reversed. It assumed, without
explicitly holding, that there is a right to informational privacy
under the Constitution.205 The Court concluded, however, that
the background investigation did not implicate that right
because there were adequate safeguards against public
disclosure.206 The Court also pointed to the government’s
interest in ensuring the security of its facilities, the fact that
the employees engage in “important work” on the space
program, and the pervasiveness of background checks in
private employment.207
In concurrence, Justice Scalia said he would reject a
constitutional right to informational privacy because it is
unmoored to any constitutional provision, and he mocked the
majority’s “sheer multiplicity of unweighted, relevant
factors.”208 He asked if the outcome would be different if the
employees were not engaged in “important work,” but were
instead “janitors and maintenance men.”209 Of course, the
answer is no: low-wage employees have never had reasonable
expectations of workplace privacy. Under current law, the
informational right to privacy is not implicated by the manner
of the government’s collection of personal information.210 At
most, it protects against public disclosure of that information.211
For the poor, public disclosure is a concern, but so is the
humiliating procedure by which personal information is
gathered. On this, the courts are silent.212

Id. at 754.
Id. at 756.
206 Id. at 756-57.
207 Id. at 757-60.
208 Id. at 763, 768 (Scalia, J., concurring).
209 Id. at 768.
210 Id. at 761 (majority opinion) (the concern is protecting against government
disclosure of private information).
211 Id. at 755-56.
212 A few state constitutions protect privacy, and California has extended
privacy protection to private conduct. Interpreting the California Constitution, a
California appellate court held that pre-employment personality tests that asked about
sexual orientation and religion violated the rights of applicants for security guard
positions at Target. See Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991). The court held that the questions were not related to job competence. Id. at
86. The case settled before it could be reviewed by the California Supreme Court.
204
205
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Privacy Statutes

Unlike many other countries, the United States does not
have comprehensive privacy regulation.213 Instead, our federal
and state statutes tackle discrete privacy issues in a piecemeal
and reactive fashion.214 A high-profile, but typical example is
the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, which forbids video
stores from disclosing video rental records.215 This law was
enacted after the Supreme Court confirmation hearings of
Judge Robert Bork, when newspapers published a list of videos
rented by the judge, thereby causing a public uproar.216 Rather
than a comprehensive privacy law, the United States relies
mostly on self-regulation by the entities that gather and
maintain personal data and puts the onus on individuals to
police their own data disclosures.217
Generally, American privacy statutes are guided by Fair
Information Practices, which the Department of Health
Education and Welfare developed in 1973 in recognition that
“people have come to distrust computer-based record-keeping
operations.”218 There are five underlying principles: (1) recordkeeping systems should not be secret; (2) people should be able
to find out what personal information is contained in records;
(3) people should be able to prevent information obtained for
one purpose from being used for another; (4) people should be
able to correct records about them; and (5) organizations that
maintain personal data should ensure the data is reliable and
take steps to prevent its misuse.219 These principles require
transparency in data collection and storage, but otherwise do
not constrain the methods or manner by which data is
collected. As one scholar has summarized, “the Golden Rule of
informational privacy [is that] sensitive personal information
given for one purpose ought not be used for other purposes

213 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE ET AL., PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY
225-29 (2006); Paul Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 910-12
(2009) (arguing that the United States should refrain from enacting comprehensive
federal privacy legislation).
214 Schwartz, supra note 213, at 912.
215 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006).
216 Schwartz, supra note 213, at 935-36.
217 See Nehf, supra note 1, at 6-7.
218 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED
PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS 28-30 (1973).
219 Id. at 41-42.
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without the express consent of the person to whom the
information relates.”220
1. The Golden Rule and Information Disclosure
Certainly, adherence to this Golden Rule would benefit
all Americans, including the poor. For instance, the federal
government oversees the Homeless Management Information
System (HMIS), which requires homeless service providers to
gather data about the homeless for the stated purpose of having
a more accurate count of the homeless and better understanding
for meeting their needs.221 The homeless are asked to reveal
general biographical information (such as name, birth date, and
social security number), and can also be asked about any
physical or developmental disabilities, HIV/AIDS status, mental
health, substance abuse, and domestic violence.222 Each homeless
person is given a “unique person identification number.”223
The Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), which regulates HMIS programs, is aware that
homeless individuals might be reticent to turn over personal
data due to “not wanting to be tracked, general privacy issues,
vanity, embarrassment, paranoia, a desire not to qualify for a
particular service, fear of being turned away, or simply not
caring enough.”224 Accordingly, HUD standards regulate the
uses and disclosure of personal information by homeless service
providers. Disclosures are permitted only under certain
circumstances, such as to avert a serious threat to health or
safety.225 Yet there are still concerns that these protections are
Gregory T. Nojeim, Financial Privacy, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 81, 82 (2000).
See J.C. O’Brien, Comment, Loose Standards, Tight Lips: Why Easy Access
to Client Data Can Undermine Homeless Management Information Systems, 35
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 673, 685 (2008). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
OFFICE OF CMTY. PLANNING & DEV., HUD’S HOMELESS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS:
ENHANCING HMIS DATA QUALITY (2005) [hereinafter ENHANCING HMIS DATA
QUALITY]. “Universal data elements” are collected and aggregated across linked,
regional Communities of Care. O’Brien, supra, at 687-88.
222 ENHANCING HMIS DATA QUALITY, supra note 221, at 50-51.
223 Id. at 53.
224 Id. at 12.
225 See Homeless Management Information Systems (HMIS), Data and
Technical Standards Final Notice, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,888, 45,928 (July 30, 2004).
Domestic violence advocates were concerned about HUD requirements that shelters
collect data about clients because:
220
221

The confidentiality of the data can be breached in various ways. The rules
permit disclosures to oral law enforcement requests, which facilitates
impostors pretexting the data. The technical standards do not require that
data disclosures be logged, which limits the ability to track these impostors.
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inadequate. For instance, permissible disclosures include those
made in response to oral requests by law enforcement officials
for the purpose of identifying or locating a suspect or material
witness. As one commentator has noted, “The ease of
accessibility to client [personal information] through oral
requests threatens to compound the already challenging task of
eliciting complete and accurate information from homeless
clients,”226 who are, by virtue of their homelessness, often living
in violation of laws that regulate their public conduct. Thus,
homeless individuals may decline social services in order to
protect themselves from arrest. Accordingly, protections
against disclosure of personal information are extremely
important for the homeless.
At the same time, even the best protection against
disclosures does not ameliorate the impact of data collection.
“[W]hether or not a specific individual can be related back to
data generated out of that individual, the life of that data will
absorb and transform the life of that individual.”227 This is
because the entire homeless population is subject to the
decisions that result from the aggregation of the data.228 In
other words, “the data determines what kinds of life are made
available by programs targeting the homeless.”229 For this
reason, one commentator states, “Contrary to HUD’s claims,
this population does not merely present an accurate picture of
homelessness in the U.S., but it rather re-makes homelessness
by reconfiguring what needs are allowed to register, and what
services can address those needs.”230 In short, data collection
has group consequences, in addition to individual ones.231 Yet
privacy law focuses resolutely on the individual. Moreover,
Insider fraud in law enforcement agencies can also be used to breach
security.
Homeless Management Information Systems and Domestic Violence, ELEC. PRIVACY
INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/dv/hmis.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2012). HUD is
planning guidance that responds to these issues in light of requirements in the
Violence Against Women Act that require client consent before data disclosures are
made. Id.
226 O’Brien, supra note 221, at 694.
227 Craig Willse, “‘Universal Data Elements,’ or the Biopolitical Life of
Homeless Populations,” 5 SURVEILLANCE & SOC. 227, 245 (2008).
228 Id. (“The population is a living entity injected with biopolitical force that
acts back upon that which made it.”).
229 Id. (noting that the agencies are using the data to secure funding and HUD
approval, rather than to improve services).
230 Id. at 248.
231 See J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1081-82 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding no
constitutional violation when juvenile social histories were shared with fifty-five
different social, governmental, and religious agencies).
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even with adherence to the Golden Rule, poor people would still
suffer the stigmatization and humiliation that occur when
information is collected because statutes do not generally
address this phase of information transfer.
2. Federal and State Privacy Statutes
The Privacy Act of 1974 is the primary statute
regulating how federal government agencies manage
information about individuals.232 In 1998, the Act was extended
to “computer matching,” which occurs when federal and state
agencies compare data about individuals.233 TANF applicants
are subject to extensive computer matching. The Privacy Act
requires, among other things, that individuals subject to
matching have opportunities to receive notice and to refute
adverse information when benefits are denied or terminated.234
As a result, when an applicant applies for TANF, she should
receive notice that the state agency may be obtaining and
matching federal records to verify her eligibility information.
The Act’s protections are detailed and elaborate, but
offer limited protection for welfare applicants. To begin with,
the Privacy Act is focused on protecting information from
governmental misuse once it is gathered. It does not focus on
the methods or forms of collection, which in the welfare system
are demeaning and stigmatizing. Further, the Act’s requirements
of notice and consent are generally meaningless, because on
welfare applications these provisions usually contain difficult to
understand jargon hidden among the reams of information and
questions contained in the forms.235 Finally, the Privacy Act does
not govern the massive amounts of personal information held
by state and local agencies, and statutory protections at this
level diverge widely.236
There are other federal privacy laws that are concerned
with protecting individuals from the disclosure of personal
information that could be embarrassing if revealed to the
5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006).
The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-503, amended the Privacy Act to add several new provisions. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(a)(8)-(13), (e)(12), (o)-(r), (u) (2000).
234 See Brown, supra note 58, at 428-29 (describing requirements of Privacy
Act as they apply to TANF applicants). Brown also discusses important privacy issues
surrounding immigration status. Id. at 430-32.
235 Id. at 428.
236 Schwartz, supra note 213, at 916-18 (discussing state statutes addressing
privacy).
232
233
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public. Thus, there are statutes that protect against disclosure
of credit histories, student records, debts, bank records, tax
returns, television viewing habits, health information, and (as
discussed above) video rentals.237 Obviously, Americans from
every social class benefit from these protections. Still, this bevy
of statutes does not protect anyone from the embarrassment
that occurs when the government or private entities gather
information in an intrusive or demeaning manner in the first
place. This mistreatment tends to happen disproportionately to
the poor and other marginalized groups. Yet another group of
statutes protects individuals from unwanted intrusion into
their private affairs, including laws that limit hacking and
unsolicited e-mails and that create do-not-call registries.238
Again, these statutes erect a wall; they do not mediate ongoing
relationships between individuals and the government or
corporations. As such, these statutes are not models for
reconsidering surveillance of the poor.
Neither are employment laws. In our at-will system of
employment, private employers face few restraints in monitoring
their employees.239 Although employee monitoring is a subject
for collective bargaining for those employees who are members
of unions, this is an ever-decreasing share of the workforce.240
While the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
prohibits the interception of data transmitted by electronic
means, it is riddled with exceptions that essentially take
private employers out of its reach.241 As a result, companies can
237 See Scot Ganow & Sam S. Han, Model Omnibus Privacy Statute, 35 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 345, 349-58 (2010) (listing federal privacy statutes).
238 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008) (criminalizing unauthorized access to a
computer); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2), (f) (2005) (creating Do-Not-Call Registry); Junk
Fax Prevention Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-21, 119 Stat. 359 (amending 47 U.S.C.
§ 227) (regulating unsolicited faxes); Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited
Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699
(regulating unsolicited commercial e-mails).
239 O’Gorman, supra note 27, at 217-18. Some notable exceptions are laws
prohibiting lie detector tests as a condition of employment and laws limiting employers
from making employment decisions based on arrest records that disproportionately
impact minorities. MADELEINE SCHACHTER, INFORMATIONAL AND DECISIONAL PRIVACY
41 (2003). Employers are also subject to the Fair Credit Reporting Act if they conduct
background credit checks of applicants or employees. Id.
240 Video surveillance, physical examinations, drug and alcohol testing, and
polygraph testing are all mandatory subjects of collective bargaining under the NLRA,
and notice must be provided. Alexandra Fiore, Note, Undignified in Defeat: An
Analysis of the Stagnation and Demise of Proposed Legislation Limiting Video
Surveillance in the Workplace and Suggestions for Change, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 525, 540-41 (2008). Penalties for employers, however, are merely a “slap on the
wrist.” Id. at 542.
241 Lawrence E. Rothstein, Privacy or Dignity? Electronic Monitoring in the
Workplace, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379, 401-03 (2000).
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monitor their employees as they work on computers or engage
in phone calls. Over the years, Congress and state legislatures
have considered bills that would limit employer surveillance
by, for instance, giving employees greater notice of when they
were being monitored or limiting monitoring of long-term
employees, but none has passed.242 This lack of statutory
protections falls hardest on low-wage employees who are
monitored most extensively.243
C.

The Common Law

The entire body of privacy law emerged from the
common law, largely as a result of a path-breaking law review
article written in 1890 by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
called The Right to Privacy which articulated a “right to be let
alone.”244 Concerned about an overzealous and sensationalistic
press coupled with instantaneous photography,245 Warren and
Brandeis asserted that the “common law secures to each
individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent
his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated
to others.”246 This new conception of privacy influenced state
courts to recognize a common law right to privacy, and by the
mid-twentieth century most states recognized four distinct
privacy torts: (1) intrusion upon seclusion, (2) public disclosure
of embarrassing private facts, (3) publicity that places a person
in a false light in the public eye, and (4) commercial
appropriation of a person’s name or likeness.247
As few poor people are celebrities, the most relevant tort
for this discussion is the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, which
protects an individual from intrusion upon his “solitude or
seclusion . . . or his private affairs or concerns . . . if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”248
Id. at 409-10.
Even public employees have limited protections because private
employment law concepts have seeped into the constitutional analysis such that there
is not much of a difference. Id. at 400; Sprague, supra note 135, at 114 (“Both the
constitutional and common law rights to privacy require an underlying expectation of
privacy; so, in this regard, the analysis is the same in both the public and private
employment scenario.”). Moreover, the Fourth Amendment “does not address questions
of the intensity or impersonality of the surveillance.” Rothstein, supra note 241, at 401.
244 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
245 Sprague, supra note 135, at 98.
246 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 244, at 198.
247 See Dean Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
248 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
242
243
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Employees have occasionally been successful in asserting this
tort against highly offensive privacy violations committed by
employers, such as video surveillance of bathrooms and locker
rooms.249 Being videotaped covertly while engaged in private
acts is distressing and causes psychological trauma.250 Of
course, this sort of conduct occurs disproportionately in lowwage workplaces,251 and most of it is never the subject of legal
action.252 In addition, overt employer monitoring is not
actionable because employees usually consent to it as a
condition of employment.253 If employees refuse consent, they
protect their privacy but lose their jobs.
Moreover, the tort of intrusion upon seclusion is
essentially impotent against electronic monitoring. As one
court summarized,
When courts have considered claims in the workplace, they have
generally found for the plaintiffs only if the challenged intrusions
involved information or activities of a highly intimate
nature. . . . Where the intrusions have merely involved unwanted
access to data or activities related to the workplace, however, claims
of intrusion have failed.254

Today, electronic monitoring by employers includes keystroke
loggers that trace every key pressed on a keyboard, phone
monitoring, and video surveillance, as well as smart ID cards
and GPS enabled cell phones and vehicles that track employee
movements.255
Tort challenges to these practices usually fail because
the tort protects only reasonable expectations of privacy (thus
mirroring Fourth Amendment standards).256 Under the
common law, it is not reasonable to expect privacy in a public
249 Fiore, supra note 240, at 547 (“It is extremely difficult for an employee to
succeed on an intrusion claim in all but the most egregious circumstances.”).
250 Robert I. Simon, Video Voyeurs and the Covert Videotaping of Unsuspecting
Victims: Psychological and Legal Consequences, 42 J. FORENSIC SCI. 884, 884 (1997).
251 NAT’L
WORKRIGHTS INST., PRIVACY UNDER SIEGE: ELECTRONIC
MONITORING IN THE WORKPLACE, available at http://epic.org/privacy/workplace/emonitoring.pdf (listing reports of intrusive video surveillance, many of which occur in
the service industry and manufacturing plants).
252 At least three states have codified this common law protection and ban video
recordings in locker rooms and restrooms and the like. See Fiore, supra note 240, at 543.
253 See Sharona Hoffman, Preplacement Examinations and Job-Relatedness:
How to Enhance Privacy and Diminish Discrimination in the Workplace, 49 U. KAN. L.
REV. 517, 570 (2001).
254 Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1188
(D. Ariz. 1998), aff’d, 306 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
255 See Sprague, supra note 135, at 84-85; William R. Corbett, The Need for a
Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 91, 103-04 (2003).
256 See Corbett, supra note 255, at 110; O’Gorman, supra note 27, at 227-30.
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context, and the workplace is considered public.257 Even if an
employee can demonstrate a cognizable privacy interest, the
courts then proceed to balance employee and employer
interests⎯a test employees rarely win because their injuries
are considered isolated and individualized.258 While all
employees face these common law limitations, the privacy
intrusions for white collar workers are less visible and less
humiliating. This may in part explain the lack of public outrage
over employer monitoring.
The limits of the common law for securing privacy for
the poor can be traced to its roots. The right to be left alone was
conceived to protect society’s elites (such as Warren and
Brandeis) from the glare of public scrutiny.259 It was grounded
in property law conceptions; people “own” their own identity
and should be able to decide how they present themselves to
the world.260 In the United States, “[p]rivacy is territorial and is
seen as a possessive right that may be alienated preemptively
and wholesale.”261 Once you enter the workplace or ask for
governmental assistance, you leave that right at the door.262
Notably, at the time Brandeis and Warren wrote their
article, the poor were subject to “scientific charity,” a movement
that relied on middle-class “friendly visitors” to enter the homes
of the poor and to provide them moral and religious
counseling.263 Prior to the scientific charity movement, the
eighteenth-century poor were warehoused in poorhouses, which
required “the poor to live within the walls of a total institution,
often in uniform, and under strict rules of behavior and
mandates of forced labor.”264 In the colonial era, the poor were
257 O’Gorman, supra note 27, at 237 (“[A]ctivities that are work-related are
generally not considered private vis-á-vis one’s employer.”).
258 Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: Common Law & Federal Statutory
Protection, NAT’L WORKRIGHTS INST., http://workrights.us/?products=electronic-monitoringin-the-workplace-common-law-federal-statutory-protection (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).
259 Warren and Brandeis bemoaned the “idle gossip” of the daily papers and
the resultant “mental and pain and distress” suffered by the subjects. Brandeis was
eventually a Supreme Court justice, while Warren was a wealthy lawyer about whom
stories appeared in the local press. SOLOVE ET AL., supra note 213, at 10-11.
260 Courts have interpreted privacy as a component of property, but a
countervailing narrative asserts that Warren and Brandeis understood that privacy
derived from “inviolate personality,” meaning “the individual’s independence, dignity, and
integrity.” Rothstein, supra note 241, at 407 (quoting Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an
Aspect of Human Dignity, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 6,
163 (Ferdinand D. Schoeman ed., 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
261 Id. at 382.
262 Id.
263 See TRATTNER, supra note 182, at 67-68; MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW
OF THE POORHOUSE 70 (10th ed. 1996).
264 GILLIOM, supra note 37, at 24.
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often bound out as servants to wealthier members of the
community.265 Today, as explained supra, the welfare system
continues to control the lives of poor mothers. Simply put, there
has never been a historical conception of privacy for the poor.
Surveillance has always been the government’s prerogative and a
tool for social control. Thus, the common law right to be let alone is
of little use to people who rely on public assistance for survival and
who navigate an ongoing relationship with government officials
and/or corporations.
III.

RECONCEPTUALIZING PRIVACY AND POVERTY

The legal system provides scant privacy protections for
the poor. Our body of privacy law is built upon the “right to be
left alone,” which ill-fits the nature of the intertwined
relationships between poor people and larger institutional actors.
The idea of being left alone creates a class differential that
shelters those who can afford it. The result is that the poor are
often subject to humiliating and stigmatizing data collection
practices. This raises the question of how the law can better
equalize privacy among all citizens. This part explores various
remedies for the class differential in privacy law and policy. First,
it examines and rejects nonlegal solutions such as improved
“customer” relations, on the one end, and increased automation, on
the other. Then, this part explores other values that give meaning
to privacy. Privacy is not an end to itself; rather, it fosters and
furthers other values. Accordingly, this part suggests how norms
of dignity, respect, and trust⎯as articulated by criminal-justice
scholars⎯can enhance privacy for the poor in the civil realm.
While each of these approaches has limitations, they provide
valuable guideposts for reconceptualizing privacy for the poor.
A.

Nonlegal Solutions
1. Service with a Smile

One optimistic, but ultimately infeasible, solution is to
make interactions between low-income people and larger
institutions more pleasant and less humiliating. Indeed, some
welfare offices have policies that encourage caseworkers to
treat “clients” with respect. Still, it is difficult to mandate
265 See William P. Quigley, Work or Starve: Regulation of the Poor in Colonial
America, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 35, 55 (1996).
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politeness and questionable whether new rights-based regimes
are desirable or effective, especially with populations that do
not view themselves as rights-bearing individuals.
Susan Bennett has articulated how and why welfare
bureaucracies use privacy-stripping tactics to discourage poor
people from applying for assistance, with devastating
consequences for the needy.266 Churned out of public
bureaucracies, the poor suffer hunger and homelessness, as
well as a “dampening of the spirit, a lowering of expectations of
any kind of fair treatment.”267 In her study of a waiting room at the
District of Columbia’s Office of Emergency Shelter and Support
Services, she found an “ethos of undisclosed information,
unexplained delays, and, above all, endless waiting, punctuated by
humiliating demands for information.”268 This ethos arose from a
variety of factors, such as a vague regulatory regime that
permitted workers to demand extreme forms of proof;269 the frontline workers’ fear of “being spare-changed” and distrust of
applicants;270 bureaucratic pressures to prevent the needy from
filing applications so as to reduce welfare rolls and avoid providing
due process protections;271 “external demands for fraud control,”272
and an inability to cope with rising demand in the face of
decreasing resources and reduced staffing.273 In this environment,
norms of “customer service” seem laughably optimistic.
On the employment side, low-wage workers experience a
different workplace than white collar workers. They usually
lack employment benefits such as health insurance or
retirement accounts. They face inflexible or unpredictable work
hours that limit access to child care and transportation. They
have few opportunities for career advancement. They are more
likely to work in unsafe or unhealthy conditions.274 They also
have less privacy. These features of the low-income workforce
are deeply structural, and require far more change than an
attitude adjustment. As David Yamada explains, employment
266 See generally Susan D. Bennett, “No Relief but Upon the Terms of Coming
into the House”—Controlled Spaces, Invisible Disentitlements, and Homelessness in an
Urban Shelter System, 104 YALE L.J. 2157 (1995).
267 Id. at 2182.
268 Id. at 2158.
269 Id. at 2187.
270 Id. at 2188.
271 Id. at 2193-94.
272 Id. at 2194.
273 Id. at 2198-99.
274 See HEATHER BOUSHEY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LOW-WAGE WORK IN THE
UNITED STATES 9-10 (2007), available at http://www.inclusionist.org/files/
lowwagework.pdf.
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law “cannot force organizations to care about the health and
well-being of their employees, require workers to vote for union
representation, or simply order everyone to be ‘nice’ to one
another.”275 And even if the law could mandate politeness, the
stigma of surveillance would stick. The sweetest social worker
in the world might search your medicine cabinets with a smile.
An employer may hand over a cup for a urine test with a polite
request. The effect is still demeaning.
2. Automation
In lieu of mandated courtesy, it might be tempting to
move in the opposite direction and limit interpersonal
interaction between low-income Americans and larger
institutional actors. Arguably, the more things are automated,
the less opportunity there is for insult. Supporters of automation
promote technology as a way to save money and ensure
consistent decisions.276 However, as Danielle Citron explains,
automation can and does fail.277
To begin with, computer programmers struggle to
properly translate complex public benefits programs into code,
resulting in violations of federal and state law.278 For instance,
Citron describes how programmers in Colorado incorrectly
coded nine hundred different public benefits rules into an
automated system, resulting in people wrongfully losing food
stamps and Medicaid.279 Furthermore, computers are not failsafe; they “misidentify individuals [with] . . . same or similar
names,”280 send faulty notices, and terminate benefits without
warning.281 At the same time, many computer programs fail to
maintain audit trails of decisions, which then make it
impossible for individuals to challenge automated decisions in
due process hearings.
At due process hearings, hearing officers are biased in
favor of automated systems, with their veneer of objectivity and
275 David C. Yamada, Human Dignity and American Employment Law, 43 U.
RICH. L. REV. 523, 554 (2009). Yamada notes, however, that the law can help workers
by “safeguarding the rights of association and collective bargaining.” Id.
276 Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1249, 1252-53 (2008).
277 Id. at 1256-58 (listing examples of automation failures).
278 Id. at 1267-68.
279 Id. at 1268, 1271-72.
280 Id. at 1273.
281 Id. at 1275-76; see also Willse, supra note 227, at 240 (discussing homeless
information management systems and stating that “database programs of course also
fall short or fail—systems crash, networks go down, files get mysteriously deleted”).
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correctness, and laypersons are hard-pressed to challenge the
source code underlying automated programs.282 The end result
is that computer programmers are, in effect, rewriting
regulations without notice and comment.283 Automation can
also be dehumanizing. As Virginia Eubanks writes, “the
structure of technological systems erase the embodied contexts
and knowledge of the people described in them.”284
Even if the errors inherent in automation could be
erased, the poor would likely still face differential treatment.
Consider the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).285 The EITC,
enacted in 1975, provides low-income, working Americans with
a refundable tax credit, which amounted to as much as $5666
in 2010, depending on family size.286 The program lifts five
million families above the poverty line each year.287 The
program has significantly increased employment among single
mothers and simultaneously lowered the receipt of welfare cash
assistance.288 Notably, the tax credit is granted via an
“impersonal and invisible process” that is far less demeaning
than public benefits programs.289
Nevertheless, low-income taxpayers claiming the EITC
receive far greater scrutiny than middle-class taxpayers.290
They are audited at higher rates,291 even though over twothirds of audited EITC claims are ultimately found to be
proper.292 The IRS believes that the EITC has a high

Citron, supra note 276, at 1283-84.
Id. at 1288.
284 Eubanks, supra note 49, at 99.
285 I.R.C. § 32 (2008).
286 EITC—Don’t Overlook It, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Jan. 28, 2011),
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=106429,00.html.
287 Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 790, 792 (2007). Brown notes, “More children are lifted out of poverty as a result
of the credit than any other governmental program.” Id.
288 Id. at 799-800.
289 Leslie Book, Freakonomics and the Tax Gap: An Applied Perspective, 56
AM. U. L. REV. 1163, 1182 (2007).
290 “No other taxpayers are subject to such scrutiny.” Brown, supra note 287,
at 791-92.
291 EITC audits “comprise roughly 36 percent of all individual taxpayer
audits.” Kate Leifeld, Creating Access to Tax Benefits: How Pro Bono Tax Professionals
Can Help Low-Income Taxpayers Claim the Earned Income Tax Credit, 62 ME. L. REV.
543, 544 (2010).
292 See Brown, supra note 287, at 791. The government focuses disproportionate
time and energy on EITC audits—since 1998, the IRS has poured over $1 billion into
EITC audits. See id. at 792. However, the data shows that audits of wealthier taxpayers
are far more productive. See id. at 808 (these audits “generally result in at least four
times the recommended additional tax than audits of low-income taxpayers”).
282
283
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overpayment rate due to fraud,293 but studies show that the
vast majority of errors result from other, unintentional factors
such as the “notoriously confusing” complexities of the
program,294 the turnover as claimants move in and out of
poverty,295 low literacy rates among low-income taxpayers,296 a
lack of access to professional tax preparers, and a fear of
turning over personal information to the government.297
Due to the distrust of EITC taxpayers, the IRS rolled
out a precertification process between 2003 and 2005 among
selected portions of the EITC population, which required
claimants to provide third party affidavits and documentation
in support of their EITC tax filings.298 By contrast, the rest of
the tax system relies on self-reporting. Thus, critics of the
precertification process charged that this differential treatment
for low-income filers was unfair and unduly burdensome.299
Dorothy Brown explains the discrepancy in audit rates
and filing requirements for the poor.300 She states that
politicians publicly equate the EITC with welfare, thus
knowingly triggering racialized welfare stereotypes in which,
“low-income taxpayers are viewed as lazy former welfare
recipients who . . . will lie and cheat in order to line their
pockets with government money.”301 By contrast, “government
subsidies that flow to predominantly white beneficiaries are
not considered to constitute welfare,” such as farm subsidies.302
Ironically, most EITC recipients are white,303 which means the
racial stereotypes harm all EITC-eligible taxpayers. EITC
enforcement shows that perceptions of class and race lead to
differential treatment even in programs that involve little faceto-face interaction. Automation alone is not the answer.

293 See Stephen D. Holt, Keeping It in Context: Earned Income Tax Credit
Compliance and Treatment of the Working Poor, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 183, 185 (2007).
294 Leifeld, supra note 291, at 547. “[T]he IRS publication associated with the
[EITC] is over fifty pages long with six separate worksheets.” Brown, supra note 287, at 792.
295 See Leifeld, supra note 291, at 547 (stating that the “pool of taxpayers who
claim the EITC is constantly changing”).
296 See Leslie Book, The IRS’s EITC Compliance Regime: Taxpayers Caught in
the Net, 81 OR. L. REV. 351, 396-97 (2002).
297 See Leifeld, supra note 291, at 550.
298 See Brown, supra note 287, at 809-10.
299 See,
e.g., id. (explaining that “[n]o other tax provision requires
precertification, while all welfare-type programs require it”).
300 Id. at 799-810.
301 Id. at 793-95.
302 Id. at 814
303 Id. at 820.
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Giving Content to Privacy Under Law

Privacy is not an end to itself; it supports and enhances
other important values. Accordingly, enhancing the
relationship between the poor and larger institutions requires
more than leaving the poor alone. In related contexts, scholars
have been working to shape a richer conception of privacy,
particularly under the Fourth Amendment as it relates to
criminal searches. Frustrated with the malleable reasonableness
standard and its failure to restrain government surveillance,
these scholars have strived to give content to the meaning of
privacy. These approaches, developed mostly in the criminal law
context, are helpful in considering the welfare-to-work
continuum because they focus on the individual’s relationship to
the state. They are also relevant because welfare has become
increasingly criminalized, and because criminal law
jurisprudence most impacts poor communities. These theories
focus on dignity, respect, and trust as values secured by privacy.
Privacy is not an end to itself; rather, it secures higher values.
To be sure, there is a tension between seeking
governmental assistance and simultaneously demanding privacy
from the state.304 Yet wealthier Americans would recoil in horror
if the government put them through similar scrutiny as a
condition of receiving governmental subsidies, such as tax
deductions for mortgages and retirement plans, and childcare
tax credits.305 Moreover, poor people do not need to be “left alone”
by the state or employer to benefit from privacy. Rather, the
advantage of the dignity-respect-trust models discussed below is
that they can accommodate intertwined relationships in a way
that privacy has not been able to bear. In the end, surveillance
needs to be proportional to its purposes. The goal is not to shut
out the state or employers, but to make them partners with lowincome Americans in a flourishing democracy.

304 See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional
Conditions and Welfare, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 931, 940 (1995).
305 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 191 (1995) (“[M]iddle-class
families benefit from extensive entitlement programs, be they FHA or VA loans at
below mortgage market rates or employer health and life insurance. These families
receive untaxed benefits as direct subsidies.”).
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1. Dignity
John Castiglione argues that dignity is an equally
important Fourth Amendment value as privacy.306 As he points
out, under the reasonableness standard’s balancing test, it is
almost impossible for an individual’s “abstract, indeterminate”307
privacy interest to outweigh the state’s concrete interest in law
enforcement and social control.308 Accordingly, he posits that
dignity can support the scaffolding of the Fourth Amendment in a
way that privacy cannot.309 He notes, people (such as prisoners)
can completely lack privacy but still claim “a legitimate
expectation of being treated with dignity.”310 In philosophical
terms, dignity is the “right to be treated as an end, not as a
means.”311 In practical terms, it is the opposite of “unnecessarily
degrading, humiliating, or dehumanizing government behavior.”312
In legal terms, the Supreme Court often uses the concept of
dignity to inform constitutional interpretation, so it is recognized
as a constitutional commitment even if rarely enforced in the
Fourth Amendment context.313 Castiglione helpfully contrasts
privacy, which protects access to the self, with dignity, which
“generally concerns a limitation on the manner in which an
individual is interacted with.”314 Under his proposal,
government searches and seizures would be unlawful if they
degrade or humiliate individuals without a sufficient
countervailing law enforcement interest.315
Similarly, David Yamada has posited that dignity
should replace “markets and management” as the framework
for American employment law.316 The current employment law
regime is dominated “by a belief system that embraces the idea
of unfettered free markets and regards limitations on

306 John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008
WIS. L. REV. 655, 655.
307 Id. at 664.
308 Id. at 660.
309 Id. at 674-75.
310 Id. at 675.
311 Id. at 678.
312 Id. at 687.
313 Id. at 680-81. See generally Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of
Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (2011) (setting forth a typology of how the Supreme
Court uses dignity).
314 Castiglione, supra note 306, at 688-89.
315 Id. at 696.
316 Yamada, supra note 275, at 524. See generally RANDY HODSON, DIGNITY AT
WORK (2001) (describing threats to dignity in the workplace).
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management authority with deep suspicion.”317 Yet this
framework benefits the rich at the expense of the poor, as
income inequality grows and workers face increasing job
insecurity, stress, and negative health consequences⎯all
without adequate legal recourse.318 At the same time, the law
fails to protect against humiliation “by having a remedial
structure that is arbitrary, expensive, and difficult.”319 By
contrast, a dignitary conception of the workplace would, among
other things, support unions and collective bargaining “as an
invaluable source of countervailing power in society,” because
they give workers a voice as well as leverage to demand a better
workplace.320 Notably, collective bargaining is one of the few
ways in our system to limit employer surveillance. Although
low-wage workers often do find dignity in their work, they do so
in spite of the law.321
Other authors have contrasted the American system⎯in
which “dignity is denied by treating the employee as a mere factor
of production . . . and ignoring . . . the worker’s individuality”⎯to
European workplace law, which emphasizes dignity and sharply
limits surveillance.322 In Europe, dignity is connected to “notions
of community and citizenship [rather] than property.”323 Under
this conception, private power is seen as great a threat to dignity
as public power.324 Thus, privacy is considered a fundamental
human right.325 For instance, workers in France have a say in
when and how employer monitoring occurs, they have the right
to be informed about the automated treatment of their personal
317 Yamada, supra note 275, at 523; see also RICHARD SENNETT, THE
CORROSION OF CHARACTER 31 (1998) (describing how the “new capitalism” emphasis on
flexibility “loosens bonds of trust and commitment, and divorces will from behavior”).
Sennett writes that information systems “give individuals anywhere in the network
little room to hide.” Id. at 55.
318 Yamada, supra note 275, at 530-31.
319 Fisk, supra note 133, at 92.
320 Moreover, unions are particularly important in the low-wage workforce,
where exploitation is rampant. Yamada, supra note 275, at 557. Dignitary norms
would also provide protections against unjust or unfair dismissal, id. at 558-61, limit
workplace bullying, id. at 562-65, and improve dispute resolution procedures for
employment-related conflicts, id. at 566.
321 See, e.g., Clare L. Stacey, Finding Dignity in Dirty Work: The Constraints
and Rewards of Low-Wage Home Care Labour, 27 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 831, 832
(2005) (“[A]ides import dignity into a stigmatised and relatively invisible occupation.”).
322 Rothstein, supra note 241, at 383-84. Cf. James Q. Whitman, The Two
Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161-62
(2004) (comparing European privacy norms, which are rooted in notions of personal
honor, with American privacy law, which is rooted in notions of liberty).
323 Rothstein, supra note 241, at 383; Nehf, supra note 1, at 81-82.
324 Rothstein, supra note 241, at 386.
325 Nehf, supra note 1, at 81-82.
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information, they receive notice about the scope of monitoring,
and monitoring must be proportional to the employers’
objectives.326 Reforming privacy to reflect dignitary values could
be helpful to low-income Americans because dignity is an
inviolable, core human right that cannot be bought or sold by
those with more access to wealth. At the same time, the
individual emphasis on dignity can obscure the class-based
motivations for and consequences of surveillance.
2. Respect
Andrew Taslitz suggests a class-conscious approach that
hinges upon respect as a central value underlying privacy.327 He
explains that courts envision the “reasonable person” interacting
with the police from the perspective of a white middle-class
person “rather than the poor person familiar with police
abuse.”328 Taslitz is particularly attuned to the disparate impact
of current Fourth Amendment doctrine on racial minorities
entangled in the criminal justice system.329 As he defines
respect, it “is also about inclusion, about being considered full
members of the wider political community.”330 He explains how
a lack of governmental respect impacts communities, which
suffer when they are targeted for suspicionless searches.331
Those searches “send a message to their victims that they are
unworthy of the government’s respect.”332 Accordingly, he urges
courts to expand their perspectives to better understand and
acknowledge minority group experiences.333 This idea of respect
would be helpful in shaping the experiences of low-income
Americans as they interact with welfare offices and low-wage
employers. Under his conception of respect, courts would have to
consider both the impact of privacy law from the perspective of
those under surveillance as well as the costs to civil society and

326 Rothstein, supra note 241, at 387-90; see also William A. Herbert,
Workplace Electronic Privacy Protections Abroad: The Whole Wide World Is Watching,
19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 379 (2008). Regarding the more vigorous protections
against workplace video surveillance in Australia and Canada, see Fiore, supra note
240, at 550-52.
327 Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 30-32 (2003).
328 Id. at 56.
329 Id. at 21.
330 Id. at 27.
331 Id. at 23.
332 Id. at 23-24.
333 Id. at 92-97.
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democratic participation when entire groups are demeaned and
subordinated.
The challenge to this approach is that the poor have
long been deemed undeserving of respect. The majority of
Americans believe that this country is a meritocracy, by which
anyone can lift themselves up by their bootstraps. This myth
leads to cultural explanations for poverty that blame the poor
for their own predicament.334
As I have explained elsewhere, the cultural explanation
of poverty is founded on conjecture masquerading as common
sense, but has no empirical support.335 Nevertheless, it has had
remarkable staying power because it demands less from
government and it appeals to the economically insecure middle
class.336 By contrast, the real causes of poverty are far more
complex. An amalgamation of economic and demographic
factors contribute to poverty, including declining labor market
opportunities, the erosion of the minimum wage and low-wage
income, deindustrialization, technological changes in the
economy, globalization, the decline of unions, and the increased
use of contingent workers who are low-wage, part-time, and
lack benefits.337 In addition, governmental urban policies have
segregated poor minority communities into areas of concentrated
poverty.338 Nevertheless, the entrenched myth of the meritocracy
makes it difficult to build a legal theory around respect.
3. Trust
Scott Sundby is similarly dismayed by the Fourth
Amendment balancing test, and he advances a reciprocal
government-citizen trust model under which the government
could not “intrude into the citizenry’s lives without a finding
that the citizenry has forfeited society’s trust to exercise its
334 See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 25, at 159-61 (describing culture of
poverty theories).
335 See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP 320 (2008) (“In the
welfare debates of the 1990s, conservative accounts of research simply misrepresented
the evidence.”).
336 See Kathleen A. Kost & Frank W. Munger, Fooling All of the People Some
of the Time: 1990’s Welfare Reform and the Exploitation of American Values, 4 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 3, 32-35 (1996) (the culture of poverty thesis “satisfies so many political
and ideological needs”).
337 See id. at 66-72; ICELAND, supra note 40, at 77-78; see also MICHAEL B.
KATZ, IMPROVING POOR PEOPLE: THE WELFARE STATE, THE “UNDERCLASS,” AND URBAN
SCHOOLS AS HISTORY 77-78 (1997); Joel Handler, “Ending Welfare as We Know It”—
Wrong for Welfare, Wrong for Poverty, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 10-12 (1994).
338 See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 149 (1998).
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freedoms responsibly.”339 In other words, citizens would not be
searched unless they did something to raise suspicion of
wrongdoing. His citizen-trust model applies most appropriately
to situations in which the state initiates an intrusion into
individual privacy (as is the case with public benefits regimes)
rather than responds to perceived wrongdoing.340 This model
recognizes that “[g]overnment action draws its legitimacy from
the trust that the electorate places in its representatives by
choosing them to govern.”341 Right now, poor Americans do not
feel “they have the opportunities and capabilities to participate
meaningfully in society,” in part due to privacy invasions that
signal a lack of trust by government. “Rights are not simply
enclaves of protection from government interference but also
affect the citizen’s view of his or her role in society.”342
Unfortunately, welfare mothers and low-wage workers
have almost no conception of rights⎯they are “the inverse of
the rights-bearing individual.”343 Moreover, a citizenship based
approach to privacy does not extend to the private market,
which often has just as much power over individuals as does
the state. Nor does it protect noncitizens, who are nevertheless
entitled to the human right of dignity. Finally, poor people who
are citizens are often excluded from mainstream norms of
citizenship. As Dorothy Roberts explains, the welfare system
treats its recipients as subjects rather than citizens for reasons
of class, gender, and race.344 Whereas citizens receive
government benefits such as social security as an entitlement
free of stigma, subjects “receive inferior, inadequate, and
stigmatizing relief at the government’s discretion.”345 She
concludes, “While welfare for citizens enables them to be selfruling persons, welfare for subjects enables the government to
rule them.”346 Until our conception of citizenship includes the
poor, a citizen-trust model may not advance their privacy.

Sundby, supra note 154, at 1777.
Id. at 1787.
341 Id. at 1777.
342 Id. at 1784.
343 GILLIOM, supra note 37, at 91.
344 Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship, 105
YALE L.J. 1563, 1577 (1996).
345 Id.
346 Id.
339
340
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The Fragile Nature of Privacy

All three of these models⎯dignity, respect, and
trust⎯add to our understanding of why privacy is valuable,
particularly for our most vulnerable citizens. Adoption of any of
these theories could transform the experiences of poor citizens as
they interact with the state and their employers. Nevertheless,
the courts appear reluctant to weave these strands into privacy
jurisprudence, even when courts rule in favor of privacy.
Consider Ferguson v. City of Charleston,347 in which the
Supreme Court used the Fourth Amendment to strike down a
public hospital’s policy (created in conjunction with local police
and prosecutors) of drug testing poor, pregnant patients
suspected of using drugs.348 The hospital implemented the policy
in the wake of a perceived crack epidemic in which thousands of
babies were reportedly being born to drug addicted mothers.349
Under the policy, patients who tested positive were referred to
substance abuse treatment programs under the threat of arrest
if they did not comply or if they tested positive in a subsequent
screening.350 The policy was enforced only in the hospital’s
Medicaid maternity clinic; it was not used in other hospital
departments or for pregnant women who paid for their care.351
The class, race, and gender differential in privacy was clear.
The Court first ruled that the urine tests constituted
searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.352 As
the Court stated, “The reasonable expectation of privacy
enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a
hospital is that the results of those tests will not be shared
with nonmedical personnel without her consent.”353 Further,
prior cases approving drug testing involved a special need
disconnected from law enforcement.354 By contrast, in Ferguson,
“the central and indispensable feature of the policy from its
inception was the use of law enforcement to coerce the patients
into substance abuse treatment.”355
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
Id. at 70-73.
349 Id. at 70 n.1.
350 Id. at 71-72.
351 Campbell, supra note 91, at 69; Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth
Amendment?: Consent, Care, Privacy, and Social Meaning in Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 23 (2002) (“[T]he Policy was applied
almost entirely to economically disadvantaged African-American women.”).
352 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 76.
353 Id. at 78.
354 Id. at 79.
355 Id. at 80.
347
348
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While the hospital argued that it had identified criteria
that raised suspicion of cocaine use, the Court found no
evidence in the record “that any of the nine search criteria was
more apt to be caused by cocaine use than by some other factor,
such as malnutrition, illness, or indigency.”356 In so doing, the
Court implicitly recognized the harmful effects of poverty and
refused to punish the mothers for being poor. Thus, the positive
narrative of Ferguson is that it took into “account the experiences
and values of women,” and “gave patient and parental autonomy
great weight” in a manner that “was offended by paternalistic
notions.”357 The Court appraised the context of the searches,
recognized the stigma that attached to the women who were drug
tested, and limited the criminalization of poverty.
However, the real-life impact of Ferguson remains limited.
The Court’s holding hinges entirely upon its disapproval of police
involvement in crafting and enforcing the hospital’s policy; at no
time does the Court articulate any values underlying the patients’
claim for privacy. This absence increases the difficulty of
stretching Ferguson to cases lacking police involvement, as the
Court seemed to intend with its narrow holding.
Thus, the scrutiny of the lives of poor, pregnant women
remains. In her ethnographic study, Khiara Bridges describes
how poor, pregnant patients seeking Medicaid coverage for
prenatal health care costs are subject to mandatory interviews
that probe the most intimate corners of their lives.358 The
information gathered goes far beyond what wealthier pregnant
women are expected to divulge to their doctors: it involves
detailed assessments regarding nutrition, psycho-social factors,
and finances conducted by a range of nurses, social workers,
and other professionals.359 The women receive education about
contraceptive options throughout their pregnancies and access to
long-acting contraception following the birth of their babies.360
As a result, the state has “all the information necessary to sweep
poor families within the ambit of child protective services, the
foster care system, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and,
if deemed necessary, the criminal justice system.”361
Id. at 77 n.10.
Taslitz, supra note 351, at 3.
358 Bridges, supra note 52, at 113, 114.
359 Id. at 124-34. Among other things, the inquiries involve “women’s sexual
histories, experiences with substance use and abuse, histories of sexual and domestic violence,
and strategies for preventing the conception and birth of more children . . . .” Id. at 163.
360 Id. at 131-32.
361 Id. at 132.
356
357

1440

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:4

Moreover, Ferguson does not change the fact that many
states criminally and civilly penalize a woman’s drug use during
pregnancy.362 In addition, at least three states have mandatory
drug testing of pregnant women in some circumstances.363 One of
the harshest state statutes is in South Carolina, where the
Ferguson case originated. In South Carolina, a positive drug test
at the time of birth results in a presumption of parental neglect
that warrants removal of a child from the mother’s custody.364
South Carolina also stands alone in approving criminal
prosecutions of women who have used drugs during pregnancy.
Although an estimated two hundred women with drug
addictions have been criminally prosecuted in thirty states for
fetal abuse,365 most appellate courts have overturned those
convictions. In South Carolina, by contrast, the state Supreme
Court held that “fetuses are ‘person[s]’ under the state’s criminal
child endangerment statute,”366 and affirmed the conviction of a
mother who had used cocaine during her pregnancy. Not
surprisingly, drug treatment programs in South Carolina have
seen their admissions of pregnant women drop, infant
mortality rates have risen, and there has been a 20 percent
increase in abandoned babies.367 Without a value-driven
approach to privacy, the class differential in privacy policies is
likely to continue. Dignity, respect, and trust are values that
can inform privacy law and policy.
IV.

EQUALITY IN PRIVACY LAW

As Ferguson demonstrates, the courts do not explicitly
equate spatial or informational privacy with the values of
dignity, respect, or trust, even though these principles would
provide meaningful guideposts to distinguishing appropriate

362 See Lynn M. Paltrow, Governmental Responses to Pregnant Women Who Use
Alcohol or Other Drugs, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 461, 464-65 (2005). In some
jurisdictions without specific laws on the subject, government officials have nevertheless
implemented policies that extend civil child abuse laws to pregnant women. Id. at 467, 474.
363 Id. at 467.
364 Id. at 465.
365 Id. at 485.
366 Id. at 488.
367 Id. at 490-91. These punitive, privacy-stripping approaches are fueled by
media hysteria rather than science. Id. at 475. The science shows that cocaine is not
always harmful to children; that drug abuse is a treatable addiction, rather than a
moral failing; that a single drug test does not predict parenting ability; and that
removing children from their mothers inflicts grave harm on children. Id. at 475-82.
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data collection from demeaning surveillance.368 Interestingly
however, there is one consistent strain in privacy cases that
emerges over the years: class equality. In his Wyman dissent in
1971 (upholding welfare home searches), Justice Douglas
pointed out the class differential in privacy law, stating, “No
such sums are spent policing the government subsidies granted
to farmers, airlines, steamship companies, and junk mail
dealers, to name but a few.”369 Over thirty years later, the
dissenting judge in Sanchez v. San Diego (a modern welfare
home visit case) wryly pointed out, “I doubt my colleagues in
the majority would disagree that an IRS auditor’s asking to
look in [‘medicine cabinets, laundry baskets, closets and
drawers for evidence of welfare fraud’] within their own homes
to verify the number of dependents living at home would
constitute snooping.”370 Similarly, the district court in
Marchwinski (overturning drug testing of welfare applicants)
quoted Justice Marshall to ask, “Would the majority sanction,
in the absence of probable cause, compulsory visits to all
American homes for the purpose of discovering child abuse?”371
As Justice Marshall stated in 1971, “Such a categorical
approach to an entire class of citizens would be dangerously at
odds with the tenets of our democracy.”372
Justice Marshall’s warning is today’s reality. Poor
people continue to suffer privacy invasions that generate
stigma and humiliation. In addition to individual harms, this
class differential in privacy harms democracy. Two in-depth
studies demonstrate the link between surveillance and
decreased democratic participation by the poor. First, Joe Soss,
in his study of welfare, has explained that poverty “strip[s]
individuals of the ability and time needed to follow or participate
in political affairs,” as well as “the autonomy needed for selfgovernment.”373 Moreover, interactions with welfare workers
leave recipients “pessimistic about government’s responsiveness
and the efficacy of political action.”374 As a result, being a welfare
368 In cases involving decisional privacy, the Court has moved away from
privacy rhetoric, instead relying on liberty. See generally Jamal Greene, The So-Called
Right to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715 (2010).
369 Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 332 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
370 Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 936 (9th Cir. 2006).
371 Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1142 (E.D. Mich. 2000)
(quoting Wyman, 400 U.S. at 342 (Marshall, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
372 Wyman, 400 U.S. at 342.
373 JOE SOSS, UNWANTED CLAIMS: THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION IN THE U.S.
WELFARE SYSTEM 187 (2000).
374 Id. at 164.
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recipient “reduces the odds that a person will vote to slightly less
than half of what it would have been otherwise.”375 For poor
women, public benefits programs are their “most direct exposure
to . . . [political] institution[s],”376 and the lessons welfare
recipients learn there “have significant consequences for broader
patterns of political action.”377 Surveillance is one way that the
welfare system “position[s] clients as objects of paternalism,”
which in turn leaves them feeling that government is not
responsive to their concerns.378
Second, John Gilliom has also studied how welfare
surveillance suppresses political action. He found that while
welfare mothers resist state control over their lives, they do not
use litigation or democratic processes to do so.379 Rather than
viewing privacy violations from a rights-based perspective, they
“focus on need and on their duties to care for their families.”380
Thus, their methods of opposition are more subtle; for instance,
they earn unreported income to supplement meager welfare
checks.381 While this defiance sustains individual autonomy in
the face of the state’s power, it also causes stress to welfare
mothers who fear getting caught and possibly losing benefits or
being punished criminally.382 Moreover, it obviates political
organizing and leaves surveillance structures intact.
Likewise, among her low-wage coworkers, Barbara
Ehrenreich found a complete lack of political consciousness or
defiance of workplace privacy intrusions. As she explains, her coworkers could not just “get-up-and-go”; rather, their mobility was
constrained by lack of transportation or child care, as well as a
lack of information with which to compare employers.383 As a
result, there is no competitive market pushing employers to treat
employees more fairly. Further, management engenders a lack of
self-respect in employees by subjecting them to random
searches.384 Resistance in the low-wage workforce often comes in
Id. at 162.
Id. at 184.
377 Id. at 4.
378 Id. at 200.
379 Gilliom found that welfare mothers do not assert rights; there is “no sign of
the mobilization and empowerment which might follow.” GILLIOM, supra note 37, at 85.
“Wherever there is unjust power, resistance inevitably follows.” HODSON, supra note
316, at 42 (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE: INTERVIEWS
AND OTHER WRITINGS (1988)).
380 GILLIOM, supra note 37, at 96.
381 See id. at 99-106, 113.
382 See id. at 87-88.
383 EHRENREICH, supra note 77, at 205-06.
384 Id. at 208.
375
376
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the form of lower productivity; sometimes, workers quit in
frustration.385 There is little political resistance. Ehrenreich
comments, “We can hardly pride ourselves on being the world’s
preeminent democracy, after all, if large numbers of citizens spend
half their waking hours in what amounts, in plain terms, to a
dictatorship.”386 The “dictatorship” is maintained, in part, by
surveillance.
This class differential in privacy should be a concern to
all Americans. It harms individuals by denying them full respect
as citizens and limiting their autonomy. It decreases democratic
participation, which in turn means there is less political check
on privacy violations. The privacy differential also exacerbates
income inequality by reinforcing class lines and disempowering
people who in turn become too downtrodden⎯or busy trying to
survive⎯to challenge public policies. The result is a downward
cycle of disempowerment and class division. These costs are
incurred with almost no countervailing benefits to individuals or
society, other than the societal satisfaction that comes from
censuring the “moral laxity” of people “unable to thrive within a
capitalist economy.”387
Of course, an equality approach means that privacy is
only as secure as the majority has it. If Americans cross class
lines and advocate together to preserve privacy and resist
surveillance, we are more likely to restrain abuses of power.
The scientists in Nelson v. NASA objected to intrusive
government questioning conducted for what they believe are
bogus security reasons. Poor Americans can relate; they have
long been exposed to the prying eyes of the state. Middle-class
and wealthy Americans need to realize that novel surveillance
techniques are typically used first on the poor. By the time
these strategies spread beyond controlling the poor, any
“reasonable expectations” against their use have dissolved.
What can equality add to privacy law and policy? It has
limited constitutional legs due to the lack of equal protection
for the poor. Laws that distinguish on the basis of wealth are
385 HODSON, supra note 316, at 42-43, 60-68. Hodson describes how employees
resist employer abuse by withdrawing cooperation and violating cumbersome rules. Id.
at 42. “All of these forms of resistance are attempts to regain dignity in the face of
organizations that violate worker’s interests, limit their prerogatives, or undermine
their autonomy.” Id.; see also Carol Cleveland, A Desperate Means to Dignity: Work
Refusal Amongst Philadelphia Welfare Recipients, 6 ETHNOGRAPHY 35, 54 (2005)
(stating that low-wage employees find their dignity under assault and often quit rather
than submit to perceived abuse and disrespect).
386 EHRENREICH, supra note 77, at 210.
387 See Bridges, supra note 52, at 163 (critiquing the use of poverty as a moral index).
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subject to mere rational basis review, and the state can usually
assert a societal reason for intruding on individual privacy. It
is a difficult scale to tip. Nevertheless, equality can inform
other constitutional provisions. For instance, under the Fourth
Amendment, a government search may not be reasonable if
targeted at individuals solely on class grounds.388 This is
intimated in Ferguson and articulated in Marchwinski.
Moreover, equality norms could be folded into the Fair
Information Principles that inform privacy laws and policies.
These principles currently focus on preventing unknowing
disclosure to third parties. However, they could be expanded to
cover the data collection phase and to forbid collection practices
that intrude on privacy in a demeaning, humiliating, or
stigmatizing way. In addition, statutory protections for
workplace monitoring could be enacted that give employees
greater notice about surveillance and limit tactics that are
disproportionate to achieve employer objectives. At the same
time, employers should recognize and replicate successful
monitoring programs that give employees notice about
monitoring, as well as a voice in surveillance strategies.
Finally, the common law could recognize the privacy interests
of and harms to low-wage employees as a group, rather than
disaggregating claims down to an individual level. Rather than
asking if a specific person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a specific workplace, courts could consider whether
employees have any reasonable expectation to be treated with
dignity by employers. In short, our privacy policies and
practices should be examined to ensure that they do not single
out a specific class of persons for stigma. The ideal of equality
can help provide a check against such targeted surveillance.
CONCLUSION
Due to advanced technologies, all Americans face
corporate and governmental surveillance. However, poor
Americans face different and more intense privacy violations
than do wealthier Americans. While most Americans are
vaguely aware that they are subject to surveillance, they do not
feel its effects concretely, and they are willing to relinquish some
privacy for increased security and for the conveniences of
technology. Yet for the poor, surveillance is neither vague nor
invisible. Rather, along the welfare-to-work continuum, poor
388

See Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1142 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
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people face privacy intrusions at the time that the state or
their employers gather data. This data collection tends to
stigmatize and humiliate, not only compounding the harmful
effects of living in poverty, but also dampening democratic
participation by the poor.
Yet privacy law is focused on middle-class concerns about
limiting the disclosure of personal data so that it is not misused.
By contrast, the poor interact with the government and lowwage employers in ways that are ongoing and interpersonal, and
as a result, the “right to be left alone” embodied in current
privacy law does not protect their interests in dignity and
autonomy. Privacy law, in its constitutional, statutory, and
common law dimensions, protects reasonable expectations of
privacy, but courts have long held that people give up
expectations to privacy when they seek help from the
government or go to work. The law thus reinforces the existing
class differential in privacy practices. This class differential has
costs not only for the poor, but for all citizens. The poor do not
need to be left alone; they need to be treated with dignity.
Privacy should not be for sale. All Americans would benefit
from enhancing the privacy rights of the poor, and united, we
can provide a powerful check on expanding surveillance that
impacts the poor and rich alike.

